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Abstract 
 American religious faith is in decline. Recent studies have recognized a dropping number 
of Americans who identify as Christian, contrasted with the “rise of the nones,” those 
Americans who assign themselves to no particular faith tradition. Amid these changes, the 
American electorate is growing increasingly polarized in political thought, views, and beliefs. 
The correlation between these two occurrences is producing consequential impacts on national 
cohesion and the operation of American democracy. The research in this thesis was directed at 
identifying connections between religion and politics, through the lens of evangelical 
Christianity and religious nones, and sought to determine how the relationship between the 
two is changing. The thesis also explored the theoretical possibility of a type of civil religion, 
one in which Americans might be trading traditional faith for a belief in a different worldview, 
politics. In other words, replacing religion with politics.   
 Methods for this study included the assessment of various religiously and politically 
themed polls as well as case studies on the evangelical Church and President Donald Trump’s 
use of civil religion. This project found the shrinking of religious association will continue. 
Polarization is affecting religious decline and more Americans are placing a greater emphasis on 
political engagement than any faith-based activities showing support for the hypothesis of the 
replacement of religion with politics. The outcome of these changes will profoundly influence 
the future of American unity and direction and the historical relationship between faith and 
government.  
 
Readers: Dorothea Wolfson, Ph.D. and Alexander Rosenthal, Ph.D. 
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 James Madison, in an 1811 letter to a North Carolinian Baptist Church, penned his 
resolve to American separation of church and state regarding the “distinction between Religion 
& Civil Govt, as essential to the purity of both.”1 Madison’s belief in this theory was grounded in 
its guarantee under the Constitution, which he had authored, and in a practical sense the 
understanding that without this separation both institutions would be adulterated.2 While the 
U.S. has long heralded its ability—rooted in its foundation—to promote the flourishing of 
government and religion, this historical relationship is changing. The shifting dynamics of 
American religious decline and the growth of partisan politics signal the relationship may be in 
jeopardy. Though at times in plain opposition, much of America’s democratic success has relied 
upon, not only their separation but also their symbiotic progress and tension. The ruin of one 
coupled with the dominance of the other could upend this critical balance of American 
democracy.  
                                                 
1 “From James Madison to Jesse Jones and Others, 3 June 1811,” Founders Online, National Archives.  
2 “From James Madison to Jesse Jones and Others, 3 June 1811,” Founders Online, National Archives. 
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 This project was conceived by a few statistics that showed concerning trends toward 
this possibility. The first was the rise of the “nones” (those Americans with no religious 
affiliation) and the related decline of traditional faith group affiliation noted by Pew Research 
Center in 2012.  The first chapter of this work, written in 2018, focuses on Pew’s finding that 
just under 20 percent of the American population is religiously unaffiliated.3 Since that writing, 
Pew updated their statistic in 2019 noting nones comprise 26 percent of the U.S population.4 
Further, nones have grown at a steady rate, increasing by one percent of the population every 
year since the initial 2012 publication.5 Second, relating to rising nones, this work cites the 
decline of America’s Christian population. This statistic has also been updated following the 
trend recognized in 2012. At that time, Christianity, which includes both the Mainline 
Protestant and evangelical traditions, comprised 73 percent of the population, by 2019 that 
number had slipped to 65 percent.6  
The third statistic that served as an impetus for this thesis connects the first two 
religious statistics to politics. It is the oft-quoted fact that Donald Trump carried 81 percent of 
the white evangelical vote in the 2016 election.7 The strength of voice in this demographic’s 
support for a presidential candidate showed a political unity in a religious group that rivaled the 
singularity of a partisan political party. In an environment of religious decline and political 
                                                 
3 Pew Research Center, “’Nones’ on the Rise,” Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life, October 9, 2012.  
4 Pew Research Center, “In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace: An update on America’s changing 
religious landscape,” Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life, October 17, 2019.  
5 Pew Research Center, “Detailed tables: Trends in religious composition of U.S. adults,” Pew Research Center, 
October 17, 2019. 
6 Pew Research Center, “Detailed tables: Trends in religious composition of U.S. adults,” Pew Research Center.  
7 Gregory A. Smith and Jessica Martinez, “How the faithful voted: A preliminary 2016 analysis,” Pew Research 
Center, November 9, 2016. 
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division, this point, in conjunction with the first two statistics, indicated that movement in the 
religious landscape and its effect on politics warranted further examination.  
The Trump presidency itself reveals major changes in the way religion and politics are 
interacting. Trump, a man who in many ways personally counteracts and contradicts the biblical 
lifestyle professed by evangelicals, has specifically appealed to and portrayed himself as a 
champion of the interests of this faith group. Even throughout his tumultuous time in office, 
including impeachment by the House of Representatives, white evangelicals have remained a 
devoutly loyal element of his base. This represents something different in the pattern of 
evangelical political engagement as historically their support has relied on a president’s 
personal moral and spiritual convictions aligning with their own. It appears, at least white 
evangelicals, may now be much more concerned with political victories and protection than any 
representation of their core beliefs in a political leader’s lifestyle. In March 2020, 94 percent of 
white evangelicals reported it was at least somewhat important that a U.S. President stand up 
for their religious beliefs while 76 percent stated it was at least somewhat important that a 
president share their religious beliefs.8 Though it is important to note these evangelical 
statistics include only the white demographic of evangelicalism, still these changing views 
reveal something deeper about faith and politics. That is, in an increasingly polarized culture, 
politics may be outpacing and replacing religion in importance and as a primary identifier for 
Americans.  
                                                 
8 Pew Research Center, “White Evangelicals See Trump as Fighting for Their Beliefs, Though Many Have Mixed 
Feelings About His Personal Conduct,” Pew Research Center, March 12, 2020.  
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Changes and strength of evangelical political engagement combined with the rise of 
religious nones and their political affiliations suggest deep ramifications to American political 
life. Politically, these groups seem to be separating and counteracting on the ideological 
spectrum and indicate a growing prominence of political affiliation over religion, removing 
once-strong deescalating buffers between Americans. This thesis attempts to understand how 
declining religious affiliation affects how Americans interact and identify politically. Chapter one 
addresses the hypothesis of declining American religion more deeply. It seeks to investigate this 
claim and understand how upcoming generations, in particular Millennials and Post-Millennials 
(or Generation Z), may affect this trend in the future. The chapter also focuses on this question 
through the lenses of evangelical Christianity and religious nones to determine how these 
groups are interacting. Much of the reassignment of American Christians and nones depends on 
social, cultural, theological, and political issues, especially for younger Americans as they 
approach adulthood in the current climate. For this reason, Chapter one looks at how 
evangelical Christianity may be approaching these topics to better understand American 
religious migration habits. 
The second chapter of this work addresses the relationship between growing political 
polarization and religious decline. Once again using evangelicals and nones, this chapter looks 
at how these groups are filling, changing, and affecting the internal dynamics of the Democratic 
and Republican Parties. Trends are also examined in how evangelicals and nones are engaging 
politically and the chapter opens the door to the third and final chapter by questioning how 
politics may be replacing traditional religious affiliation as a primary identifier for individual 
Americans. Chapter two also introduces and argues an important theory, one fronted by 
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political scientist Michele Margolis, that U.S. politics now serves as a primary driver to religious 
affiliation later in life. In other words, political ideology is becoming a more influential and 
earlier factor in American lives than religion. Following this theory, this thesis aims to link 
Margolis’s idea with the current state of American civil religion (ACR).   
Chapter three more specifically addresses civil religion and seeks to analytically 
determine if Americans are trading religion for politics. The chapter looks at the trend of U.S. 
political engagement compared to religious engagement. Further, it examines the historical 
understanding of civil religion and attempts to determine how ACR is represented in the 
current climate. Has ACR fundamentally changed from its traditional definition during the 
second half of the 20th century? Does it still mean the same thing as it did then, or is it now 
better understood as a political tool to rally support for a specific party or cause? A case study 
on how President Trump has utilized civil religious themes provides context for these questions 
and clarity to how civil religion may or may not exist at this time. The chapter includes a 
discussion on the current evangelical relationship with the President and posits the 2020 
presidential election will reveal how this faith group responds to a unique challenge between 
political and spiritual priorities. 
At the time of this writing, the U.S. is experiencing extraordinary circumstances due to a 
global pandemic and national civil unrest after the May 2020 killing of George Floyd. The 
current social and political climate represents one unlike any other time in domestic history and 
especially so for current generations of Americans. These events provoke both individual and 
national introspection about belief and what America represents, a countrywide reckoning of 
sorts. American political and religious beliefs are wrapped tightly into this introspection and the 
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outcome will provide key indicators to how religion and politics are changing. Circumstances 
and implications at the time of the outset of this thesis between faith and politics were far less 
consequential than they are today. How America responds to these crises and the voice it takes 
as a result will lead to a better understanding of the true health, when pushed to the extreme, 
between these two institutions and a more accurate assessment of how well the U.S. has 




















 American Religious Decline 
  A Concerning Trend? 
 
 Alexis De Tocqueville, from his early observations of 19th-century American society, 
wrote of American religion, “The spirit of man, left to follow its bent, will regulate political 
society and the City of God in uniform fashion; it will if I dare put it so, seek to harmonize earth 
with heaven… From the start politics and religion agreed, and they have not since ceased to do 
so.”9 Tocqueville’s note of the congeniality between politics and religion has served as a shining 
example of the experiment of American democracy. However, identifiable changes in the 
traditional presence of organized religion in the 21st century U.S. landscape may be 
fundamentally altering this point. In October 2012, a Pew Research Center poll showed a 
growing number of Americans reported “none” as their religious belief. “Nones” are 
categorized as those Americans who claim no affiliation with a major faith group. Between 
                                                 
9 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Mayer trans. George Lawrence (New York, NY: Harper 
Perennial, 1966), 287-288.  
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2007 and 2012, Pew found the percentage of religiously unaffiliated Americans grew from 15 to 
20 percent.10  
 Given the strong heritage of religious identification in America, the Pew study illustrates 
a potentially concerning trend for those who believe religion provides the backbone of 
American morality, community, and character. Though the observations from the Pew study, 
now over five years old, show a glimpse of the 2012 environment, generational numbers signal 
this trend will continue. Pew notes that those aged 18-29, the youngest group surveyed, 
comprise the highest number of “nones” at 32 percent. Older generations show stronger 
support for religious affiliation as age increases with seniors above age 65 at only 9 percent 
unaffiliated.11 If this model holds, America will experience a major shift in how people 
commune and practice faith, or not, with continually decreasing numbers of religious 
involvement.  
 Religious faith groups hold critical influence and power in American politics and 
discourse. From the Puritan foundations of America’s birth, de Tocqueville’s 19th-century 
observations of the power of religious community, and modern importance of religious 
affiliation to certain political campaigns, religion has played a multi-faceted and crucial role in 
America. For example, the evangelical Christian bloc rose to political prominence during the 
2000 election cycle as George W. Bush maneuvered to capture this faith group’s vote. Donald 
                                                 
10 Pew Research Center, ‘“Nones” on the Rise,’ Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life, October 9, 2012.  
11 Pew Research Center, ‘“Nones” on the Rise,’ Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life.  
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Trump specifically campaigned for the evangelical vote and was richly rewarded with 81 
percent of white evangelicals casting votes for the Republican candidate in 2016.12  
In 2015, evangelicals represented the largest Christian group in America and constituted 
25.4 percent of the U.S. population.13 Will the traditional representation of the Christian church 
in America no longer be a trusted demographic? This project addresses the potential for change 
in American religious views and its relation to politics. The question is three-fold. First, is 
religious affiliation and identity in America really declining and more so with younger 
generations? Second, as one of the most populated and influential religious groups, is 
evangelicalism specifically declining among Millennials? Lastly, if so, what is the main factor 
driving younger Americans away from the Evangelical church?  
Polarization in American politics, along with the changing religious practices of younger 
Americans, suggests young people are leaving the faith groups of their parents. A potential 
disconnect is a traditional characteristic of the evangelical community, unwavering support of 
the conservative arm of Republican politics which many young Americans see as incompatible 
with the true message of the Church or Scriptures. Though many reasons can explain 
disengagement, this idea will become prominent as young Americans continue to reject 
political alignments and the partisan divide—especially in their places of worship. It is 
important to determine how and why America is shifting, not only will this affect the makeup of 
                                                 
12 Gregory A. Smith and Jessica Martinez, “How the faithful voted: A preliminary 2016 analysis,” Pew Research 
Center, November 9, 2016. 
13 Pew Research Center, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape” Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life, 
May 12, 2015. 
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the fabric of the American identity, but also the way Americans vote, act, live, and pass down 
their beliefs and traditions to future generations.  
 
Literature Review 
 Kenneth Wald’s work, Religion and Politics in the United States, serves as a benchmark 
text for examining religion and its influence in America. His book not only discusses the impact 
of several different religious groups but also statistically examines the impact of religion on 
various aspects of government and public life. Wald proves the United States is an outlier to the 
general belief that modernity and industrialism result in the death of organized religion. He 
writes, “By all the normal yardsticks of religious commitment—the strength of religious 
institutions, practices, and belief—the United States has resisted the pressures toward 
secularity.”14 Conclusively, after looking at the influence of religion overall, Wald adds that 
religious piety and participation are less influential than how Americans apply their religious 
beliefs. Simply, religious involvement is not as indicative of a factor for determining religiously 
motivated action or belief as we might believe. Additionally, he observes “An upsurge in 
religiously based political activity is neither to be welcomed uncritically nor condemned out of 
hand.”15 Ultimately, religion in America has survived well and trends of resurgence or decline 
might be less radically altering than they appear.  
 Wald’s work establishes an important baseline study of religion and politics, but more 
recent scholarly work and data analysis shows trends that reflect new collaborative insight. 
Prevailing is the indication referenced by the “nones” study, that religious involvement, in all 
                                                 
14 Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1992), 9.  
15 Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, 362. 
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groups, is in decline in America. Though Wald’s second edition, published in 1992, showed a 
largely unchanged rate of churchgoing in earlier decades, since then participation has changed 
in the traditional sense. The number of religiously unaffiliated Americans has risen sharply in 
recent years.16 Americans are weakening in their allegiances to organized religion and the 
number of people without any association with religion, at any point in their lives, is growing.17 
Later studies point to a more concerning view. For example, in 2007: 
Younger adults are already less actively involved in their congregations than older adults 
are. Not only this, younger adults are currently less involved than younger adults were a 
generation ago. The demographics behind this declining involvement also do not bode 
well for the future.18 
 
The trend in religious disengagement monitored above also follows the upcoming younger 
generations.  
 Millennials show signs of continued growth in religious non-participation. The defining 
birth years of the Millennial generation, like most generational groups, are disputed among 
academics, pollsters, and pundits. The Pew Research Center, for their purposes, defines 
Millennials as people born between 1981 and 1996 and those born after 1997 as “post-
Millennials.”19 Most analysts generally subscribe to this definition of Millennials. The Post-
Millennials, the subsequent group to Millennials, are also referred to as Generation Z.20 
Generationally, Millennials are less likely than older Americans to be affiliated with a religious 
                                                 
16 Mark Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 18-19.  
17 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 51.  
18 Robert Wuthnow, After the Baby Boomers: How Twenty- and Thirty-Somethings are Shaping the Future of 
American Religion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 17.  
19 Michael Dimock, “Defining generations: Where Millennials end and post-Millennials begin,” Pew Research 
Center, March 1, 2018.  
20 Dimock, “Defining generations: Where Millennials end and post-Millennials begin,” Pew Research Center. 
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group and less likely to participate when compared to older generations at the same age.21 
Although Millennial religious affiliation is declining, they do share many of the same spiritual 
beliefs and religious views as older generations and hold traditionally to these values.22 They 
also demonstrate their spirituality in less formalized ways as many prefer independent and 
personal connections outside of a traditional house of worship.23 A key difference is the 
divergent political and social views of Millennials compared to previous generations. They are 
more likely to embrace less conservative political leanings and views that confront traditional 
religious doctrines.24  
Translating to evangelical Christianity, evangelical beliefs have meshed easily with 
socially conservative politics, but “…younger evangelicals are not as closely tied to the 
Republican Party as are older generations….”25 The shift can be traced in some part to general 
dissatisfaction with President George W. Bush among younger evangelical Christians.26 The 
impact of more recent administrations namely Obama and Trump might continue to provide 
clarity and empirical support for this trend. 
                                                 
21 Richard D. Waters and Denise Sevick Bortree, “‘Can We Talk About the Direction of This Church?’: The Impact of 
Responsiveness and Conflict on Millennials’ Relationship With Religious Institutions,” Journal of Media and 
Religion, 11:4, November 20, 2012, 201 and Luis Lugo, “Religion Among the Millennials: Less Religiously Active 
than Older Americans, But Fairly Traditional in Other Ways,” Pew Research Center: A Pew Forum on Religion and 
Public Life Report, February 2010.   
22Luis Lugo, “Religion Among the Millenials: Less Religiously Active than Older Americans, But Fairly Traditional in 
Other Ways,” Pew Research Center: A Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Report, 2. 
23 Melissa H. Sandfort and Jennifer G. Haworth, “Whassup? A Glimpse Into the Attitude and Beliefs of the 
Millennial Generation,” Journal of College and Character, 3:3, 2002. 
24 Lugo, “Religion Among the Millenials: Less Religiously Active than Older Americans, But Fairly Traditional in 
Other Ways,” Pew Research Center: A Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Report, 2.  
25 Amy E. Black, “Evangelicals, Politics, and Public Policy,” in The Future of Evangelicalism in America, ed. Candy 
Gunther Brown and Mark Silk (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 148. 
26 Black, “Evangelicals, Politics, and Public Policy,” in The Future of Evangelicalism in America.  
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 Another recognizable trend related to conservativism is, even with an overall decline in 
religious participation, a correlation between greater religious participation and more politically 
conservative views. Data collected from 1972 to 2008 show this connection has grown stronger 
after 1992.27 Surveys found the frequency of service attendance affected the strength of both 
political and social views, equating greater attendance with stronger conservative views.28 This 
projects a broadening gap between, not only those within faith groups but also more generally 
between those who are regular religious participants and the rising “nones.” This gap, however, 
has the potential to feed polarization and those who will benefit from increased division. The 
rift represents the potential for a developing “culture war” and is “unhealthy for the civic life of 
our nation.”29 
 The factors contributing to this growing divide, and more broadly to the lessening of 
religious identification in America, are largely debated among academics and researchers. 
Certain trends manifest and warrant discussion. Strongly represented is the thesis that changes 
in family structure and American home life with new generations have pushed back religious 
involvement. The age at which Americans are married, the age they begin having children, and 
the number of children they have, greatly affects their level of affiliation with organized 
religion.30 Because younger Americans are beginning these life cycles at a later age than 
previous generations, they are not interested in connecting with local church communities. This 
                                                 
27 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 95-96.  
28 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 95-96. 
29 Wuthnow, After the Baby Boomers: How Twenty- and Thirty-Somethings are Shaping the Future of American 
Religion, 232.  
30 Wuthnow, After the Baby Boomers: How Twenty- and Thirty-Somethings are Shaping the Future of American 
Religion, 17.  
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delay holds consistent with the upcoming generation and points to a continued decline in 
religious affiliation.31  
Family structural changes also contribute to this as previous generations are 
characterized by a more traditional makeup of a two-parent household with children which was 
more likely to identify with a faith group. Family dynamics of younger Americans are far less 
traditional and reflect greater diversity producing a broader mixture, or lack thereof, in religious 
participation.32 Many other variables affect these changes in generational differences and 
religious affiliation including education, the internet, social media, income, and the state of the 
economy.  
 An alternative explanation for a lack of religious membership is reaction to the 
association of traditional religion and conservative politics. Referencing the rise of the 
religiously unaffiliated, starkly demonstrated in the 1990s and 2000s, some scholars argue the 
conservative political connotation affiliated with religion pushed many lukewarm Americans 
away from a religious subscription. “After 1990 more people thought that saying you were 
religious was tantamount to saying you were a conservative Republican. So people who are not 
particularly religious and who are not conservative Republicans now are more likely to say that 
they have no religion.”33 As polarization continues to strengthen with religious affiliation, this 
could drive a more recent surge in faith group non-affiliation. Younger generations of 
                                                 
31 Wuthnow, After the Baby Boomers: How Twenty- and Thirty-Somethings are Shaping the Future of American 
Religion, 17. 
32 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 52-53.  
33 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 20-21.  
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Americans, more open to liberal social and political views than their parents, could intensify 
polarization within religious circles.  
  Protestant Christians have not been immune to decreased involvement in faith groups. 
Mainline Protestants, typically more socially and theologically liberal than conservative 
evangelical Christians, have experienced a drastic loss in numbers. Interestingly, perhaps tied to 
the noted conservativism and religious affiliation connection, evangelical groups have survived 
better than other Christian branches.  
Since 1972, the percentage of Americans affiliated with theologically more liberal, 
mainline denominations has steadily declined while the percentage affiliated with more 
conservative, evangelical denominations increased slightly until the early 1990s and has 
remained stable since then. By 2008, twice as many people claimed affiliation with 
conservative denominations as with theologically more liberal ones: 28 percent 
compared with 14 percent.34  
 
In addition to conservativism, evangelicals true to their name and belief in evangelizing to 
nonbelievers, have increased their membership. Former Catholics make up the largest group of 
new evangelicals showing a rise from four to nine percent in one generation.35 Retention of 
new members is the greatest contributor to evangelical membership success. The Evangelical 
church has historically retained their young members through the sometimes-unstable 
transition to adulthood. Evangelicals have also surpassed Mainline Protestants and other 
groups because “they have drawn in more converts, they have been more successful in 
attracting former Catholics, and they have done better at launching churches that drew in 
recruits in parts of the country that were not their traditional bastions of strength.”36  
                                                 
34 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 87.  
35 Wuthnow, After the Baby Boomers: How Twenty- and Thirty-Somethings are Shaping the Future of American 
Religion, 79. 
36 Wuthnow, After the Baby Boomers: How Twenty- and Thirty-Somethings are Shaping the Future of American 
Religion, 80-81.  
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 Though evangelicals have demonstrated more retention than most, Millennials not only 
make up the largest generational portion of the religiously unaffiliated, but their representation 
in evangelical denominations is the least of all evangelical generations. In 2007, Millennials 
composed only 11 percent of Evangelical Protestants, the smallest percentage of all 
generations, and only one percent greater than Mainline Protestants, the lowest represented 
millennial religious group polled.37 Given the weak representation of Millennials in the 
evangelical community, the generational differences between evangelical Millennials and older 
members are significant. Young evangelicals are more likely to match social views with their 
generational colleagues outside of the religious tradition, but do hold mixed political views 
from their counterparts and may align more politically with older evangelicals on certain 
issues.38 
 Where evangelical Millennials map on various issues is difficult to track compared to 
their secular counterparts and other generations within and outside of the faith. Even with 
declining religious participation among Millennials and generational differences, sustained 
consistency within the evangelical community exists. “The relative size of evangelicals within 
American society in 2050 will likely continue to remain about the same size as that found 
today—and this is true despite the likely growth in the population of the religiously unaffiliated 
over the same period of time.”39 
 Further clouding the future outlook of evangelical and broader religious affiliation are 
the generational characteristics of Millennials, the more recent political and social 
                                                 
37 Corwin E. Smidt, American Evangelicals Today, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013), 73.  
38 Smidt, American Evangelicals Today, 219.  
39 Smidt, American Evangelicals Today, 224. 
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environment, and the effect of upcoming generations. An indicative trend is declining 
confidence in organized religion and specifically religious leaders. “Between 1973 and 2008, the 
numbers of people with a great deal of confidence in religious leaders declined from about 35 
percent to under 25 percent.”40 The study also shows Americans had less confidence in 
religious leaders than in leaders of other institutions.41 Combined with the skeptical 
characteristic of Millennials, this potentially highlights a growing concern for religious 
affiliation. In a study on Millennial relationships with religious institutions, the authors found, 
“…the key to increasing Millennials’ involvement with organized religion is to increase their 
feelings of trust and satisfaction. These findings echo existing literature that documents the 
flight from established, traditional religious denominations for nondenominational 
institutions.”42 Additionally, Millennials desire a relationship with religious groups that serve 
and address their concerns, needs, and doubts in return for participation.43  
 Considering the noted pushback from the conservative political identity and the 
Millennial generational differences in political and social issues, evangelical and other 
Protestant faith group support for President Trump in the 2016 election and amidst current 
policy decisions, could further isolate younger Americans. Recent hot-button issues such as 
immigration policy and gun control highlight potential conflict areas between younger and 
older generations of Americans within religious communities. Another important aspect and 
issue in this paper is the lack of recently collected data and polling. Almost all data analyzed in 
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this study covers decades of time, but most recently, only the end of the first decade of the 
2000s. The aforementioned environment, which includes a new generation of Post-Millennials 
or Generation Z is mostly, if not completely, excluded. School shooting protests, immigration 
disputes, and the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections, could provide valuable insight into 
potential changes in religious affiliation and evangelical identification. This time period will help 
illustrate a more accurate and definitive picture of the future American religious landscape.  
 
Methodology 
 This study uses data from various religious polls to evaluate the questions of the decline 
of American religious affiliation presently and in future generations, the decline of evangelical 
identification among Millennials, and the reasons for separation from the evangelical faith. In 
most cases, pollsters directly asked participants for self-assessed religious identity, from 
sources including Pew, Gallup, and PRRI.44 This study examines the results from these polls, 
which ask related questions, to find similarities or trends in the results. The compiled figures 
include separate polls that ask different questions applicable to the overall research questions. 
Barna studies were used to provide polling answers of religiously affiliated youth and 
Generation Z input.45 Comparing trends over time to different polling questions and sources 
comprises the majority of the study to show generational changes in religious affiliation.  
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 Case studies on recent changes in the Southern Baptist Convention and National 
Association of Evangelicals, in terms of membership, leadership, and views, provide a relevant 
and timely look at the majority of the evangelical denomination as an indicator of the larger 
evangelical community.     
 
Data Presentation 
 As referenced in the literature review, many variables affect what one might define as 
religious affiliation. Several aspects determine religious affiliation or identification in the U.S. 
and are important to understand when attempting to determine decline. These include self-
identification, time or finances contributed to a religious faith group, attendance at weekly 
services, and also the individual strength of religious views shared with a specific group. This 
study centers on assessing affiliation primarily by self-identification by polling participants and 
views and beliefs of upcoming generations. 
First, is America actually becoming less religiously affiliated? Three recent polls provide 
important evidence about how Americans view religious identification and affiliation. Figure 1.1 
shows the percentage of respondents who identified with various faith groups in a 2007 and 
2014 Pew, a 2016 Public Religion Research Group (PRRI), and a 2016 and 2017 Gallup poll. Pew 
respondents were asked the religious denomination with which they most identified. If 
respondents described themselves as “born-again or evangelical Christian” without giving a 
specific denomination, they were associated with the evangelical Protestant faith group.46 PRRI 
                                                 
46 Pew Research Center, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape” Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life, 
103. 
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used the same two terms when categorizing evangelicals and also used self-identifying 
questions.47 
 
Figure 1.1 – Percent of Americans that Identify with Various Faith Groups 
 
 
Sources: Pew Research Center, Public Religion Research Institute, and Gallup. Graph compiled by the author. 
 
 As shown in Figure 1.1, the percentage of Americans affiliated with a religious faith 
group is in decline. Several interesting trends emerge in religious affiliation over time. First, 
Protestant Christianity, the largest group in each poll shows a decline from 78.4 percent of the 
American population in 2007 to 70.6 percent in 2014 (Pew).48 A separate poll reports a small 
decline in Protestant Christianity in 2016 at 48.9 percent to 48.5 percent in 2017 (Gallup).49 
Overall, Gallup shows a marginal decline in Catholic affiliation as well between 2016 and 
2017.50 Interestingly, all other major groups are relatively steady, with almost no change in 
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affiliation between 2007 and 2017. Specifically, Jewish affiliation held stable or grew slightly 
while Muslims held stable, or in the case of the Pew poll, grew by a half percent.  
 
The Decline of Religious Identification 
Another observation is the rise in the unaffiliated or “nones” percentage. From 2007 to 
2014 Pew reported an increase of 6.7 percent in no religious identity while Gallup showed half 
a percent increase from 2016 to 2017.51 The PRRI data from 2016 closely matches the 2016 
percentages from Gallup. In 2016, PRRI reported the highest unaffiliated response at 24 
percent.52 Referencing the 2012 Pew survey that reported the rise of the “nones,” Pew 
recorded a 2.8 percent increase in unaffiliated respondents in 2014.53 Compared to the five 
percent increase from 2007 to 2012, this rate is holding strong. This more recent data shows a 
decline in major faith group affiliation over time. Judaism and Islam represent a small but 
slowly growing aspect of the religious American landscape while the larger groups of Protestant 
Christianity and Catholicism are experiencing consistently decreasing numbers of affiliates.  
 While religious affiliation presents an interesting window into American religious 
identification and life, the data suggest there are generational differences for those who do not 
identify with any particular religion. Whereas Figure 1.1 shows the overall percentage of 
American religious affiliation without taking into account generational differences, Figure 1.2 
represents only those who do not identify with a specific religion (the nones) by generation. 
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Accounting for generations provides insight into the future and a look at how America is 
changing compared to the past.  
 
Figure 1.2 – Percent Religiously Unaffiliated by Generation 
 
 
Sources: Pew Research Center and Barna. Graph compiled by the author.  
 
 Figure 1.2 shows the percentage of religious nones in four different generations at 
comparable ages. This reduces the impact of the change in religious views as generations grow 
older and offers a more accurate assessment of changes in America’s religious identification. 
The figure shows a consistent increase in religious non-affiliation with the newest Generation Z, 
those born between 1999 and 2015, with the highest percentage of all generations, 34 
percent.54 This illustrates a continued generational increase in separation from major faith 
groups in America.  
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 Another study, tracking American nones among youth ages 18-29 conducted between 
1973 and 2008 yielded similar, if not more telling, results. The study showed religious non-
affiliation at about 13 percent in 1973 with the lowest, 11 percent, just before 1990.55 After 
1990, the rate increased significantly with the highest percentage at the most recent date, 
above 25 percent in 2008.56 Figure 1.3 shows a jump from college freshmen who had no 
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Source: Putnam and Campbell. Graph compiled by the author.  
 
Given the dramatic increase in religious nones for each generation, it is likely this trend will 
continue and the percentage of Americans without a religious affiliation will continue to rise, 
diluting the representation of religion in America. 
 
The Future of Evangelicalism 
 The next question concerning the future status of evangelicalism as a specific faith 
group will be largely determined by future generations. Evangelical Christians might represent 
the most significant demographic in understanding trends in U.S. religious dynamics. Due to 
their political influence and strong numbers the status of evangelical Christianity is integral in 
determining the overall picture of American religion. Analyzing evangelicalism involves a similar 
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followed by a study of younger generations and their relationship with the evangelical label. 
Figure 1.4 shows a yearly trend from Pew Research of evangelical affiliation. 
 
Figure 1.4 – Percentage of U.S. Adults Who Self-Identify As Evangelical 
 
 
Source: Pew Research Center. Graph compiled by the author.  
 
 For nearly a decade, the evangelical community has remained relatively unchanged. 
Pew reports only a one percent decrease in self-identified evangelicals from 2009 to 2018.58 At 
no point in the study did the percentage change more than three points, though the smallest 
percentage does occur in 2017 and Pew notes the 2018 collected data is difficult to assess at 
such an early point in the year.59 Though the most recent years could indicate a slow decline in 
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evangelicalism, the percentage holds stable over time showing surprising, when compared to 
other religious groups, consistency in affiliation.  
 The Pew large-scale religious landscape study published in 2015, illustrates the role of 
evangelical identification compared to other major faith groups. The study conducted from 
2007 to 2014 does not include the most recent years from Figure 1.4 but does provide valuable 
information. Figure 1.5 indicates the change in religious faith group affiliation in America during 
a seven-year span.   
 
Figure 1.5 – Percent Change in Religious Population (2007-2014) 
 
Source: Pew Research Center. Graph compiled by the author.  
 
 As shown in Figure 1.5, compared to other major faith groups, evangelical Christians 
experienced the lowest decline rate with only a 0.9 percent negative change in affiliation.60 
Other groups, which included Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism did increase, but only when taken 
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as a collective group including other unnamed smaller faiths. Notably, the 6.7 percent increase 
in the unaffiliated group, far exceeds the mostly negative trend in overall faith group 
affiliation.61 In Pew’s study, Christianity in general, experienced a marked decline, though the 
evangelical Protestant tradition largely held stable. Pew assesses Mainline Protestants, along 
with other Christian affiliates, are losing greater numbers within the Christian label contributing 
to an overall decline. From 2007 to 2014, Pew determined the Christian population in America 
decreased from between 2.8 million and 7.8 million.62 Given the small percentage of evangelical 
decline in Figure 1.5, the Pew study concludes, considering the margin of error, that Evangelical 
Protestants in number have remained unchanged or possibly increased by 5 million 
participants.63  
 
The Younger Generations  
Once again, as in the more general discussion of religious faiths, examining the 
preferences, leanings, and affiliations of Millennials and Post-Millennials to the evangelical and 
Mainline Protestant faith groups shows a better glimpse of changes in the religious landscape. 
This section assesses the viewpoints and identities of upcoming generations to answer the 
question if young evangelicals are leaving the faith, then why? Younger Americans not only 
show a dramatic increase in religious non-affiliation compared to older generations, but they 
also comprise the smallest age group of evangelical believers. In a 2007 Pew study, 18 to 29-
year-olds represented only 22 percent of the total population of American evangelical 
                                                 
61 Pew Research Center, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape” Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life, 3. 
62 Pew Research Center, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape” Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life, 7. 
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churches, the lowest age group by four percentage points of all other generations in that 
community.64 In the Mainline Protestant tradition, 18 to 29-year-olds represented only 12 
percent of the faith group while they held nearly equal representation to other generations in 
Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism.65  
 A more recent study, published in 2018, shows a growing separation from organized 
religion and specifically Christianity in younger generations. A major finding is a roughly 
doubled number of self-identified Atheists in Generation Z compared to Millennials. 13 percent 
of Generation Z members claimed Atheism, while only seven percent of Millennials identified 
with this label.66 Generation Z also showed a two percent less affiliation with Christianity than 
Millennials.67 
 Another Barna poll observed the spiritual actions of teenagers ages 13 to 17, including 
one of the core tenets of evangelicalism, the sharing of faith with non-believers. Figure 1.6 
represents the responses of over 600 “born again” evangelical teenagers from 1997 to 2009. 
Among other personal activities, participants were asked if they had proselytized to non-
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Figure 1.6 – Percent Polled of “Born Again” Teenagers Who Explained Belief in 
Jesus To A Non-Believer 
 
 
Source: Barna. Graph compiled by the author.  
 
 As represented in Figure 1.6, the number of teenagers who reported proselytizing 
peaked at nearly 70 percent in 1998, but personal evangelism dropped to 46 percent by 2009.68 
Although prayer and tithing also decreased over time, the declining percentage of evangelism 
of non-believers could represent a more public recession of the faith group in American culture 
among younger generations. It could also represent a disengagement from involvement in civic 
life in general.  
 Determining the exact reasons for the shrinking of Millennial and Post-Millennial 
involvement in religion, and specifically evangelical Christianity is a difficult task. Many factors 
influence a young person’s propensity to disengage. A 2016 study polled non-Christians from 
                                                 















1997 1998 2001 2002 2009
 
  30 
multiple generations to determine their greatest barriers to faith. The greatest barrier to all 
generations involved the issue of balancing a good God with the presence of evil and suffering 
in the world while the second greatest barrier was the view that Christians are hypocrites. 23 
percent of Generation Z responded to Christian hypocrisy with 29 percent choosing the conflict 
between a good God and evil or suffering as their largest barrier.69 Millennials had the highest 
collective voice of any of the four generations polled at 31 percent on Christian hypocrisy as 
their primary barrier to faith.70  
 Based on the changing and differing social and political views of both secular and 
religious Millennials from their parents, the perceived hypocrisy of American Christians by non-
believers in this generation could represent a response to the increased political conservatism 
associated with religious identification. It is also possible the strong Republican and evangelical 
support for Trump in the 2016 election served as a galvanizing event for younger generations 
skeptical and troubled about an increasingly politicized faith. However, a July 2018 Pew study 
explains the trending decline of Christian affiliation in America preceded recent political 
events.71 A 2016 poll noted, “…a millennial ‘exodus’ from religion precisely over the 
conservative stance against gay rights in their churches—fully a third of ‘religious nones’ claim 
to have left religion because of a disagreement over gay rights.”72 The authors explain the 
increase in no religious identification as a reflected phenomenon in the religious sphere of the 
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increasingly partisan divide in America.73 Recent changes in the leadership of the Southern 
Baptist Convention illustrate a growing schism among evangelicals perhaps due to this growing 
divide and politicization of religious beliefs inside the Christian community.  
 
The Southern Baptist Convention 
 Regarding the issue of Millennial evangelical disengagement, the Southern Baptist 
Convention’s recent evolution provides a relevant case study of a denomination directly 
confronting this issue. Arguably, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) is the largest and most 
influential organization under the American evangelical label. The SBC is a widespread 
conglomeration of affiliated churches that includes over 47,500 Baptist fellowship churches and 
4,500 mission churches.74 The total membership of parishioners in the SBC exceeds 15 million 
with over 5 million weekly service attendees.75 As a major institution in the American 
evangelical community, the SBC has recently faced changes in membership trends, leadership, 
and embroiled public relations in the past year. Although the number of Southern Baptist-
affiliated churches and worship service attendees increased in 2017, the SBC has reported an 
overall loss of 1.3 million committed members since 2006.76 Baptism rates also fell for eight of 
the past ten years with 26.5 percent fewer baptisms than in 2007.77 Even with an increase in 
church plants and attendees, declining membership and baptisms illustrates a lack of strong 
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individual commitment to the organization and perhaps a shift to the middle among more 
lukewarm evangelicals.   
 In May 2018, during the height of the #MeToo movement, the Southern Baptist and 
evangelical community experienced a major crisis, when a prior student of the Southeastern 
Baptist Theological Seminary revealed to the Washington Post that Southwestern Baptist 
Theological Seminary leader Paige Peterson, along with other officials, did not properly report 
her rape allegation and encouraged her to forgive and drop the charge in 2015.78 As a result of 
the nationally publicized controversy, Patterson, a prior president of the SBC and a conservative 
evangelical, was fired by the board and stripped of benefits.79 His firing resulted in a social 
media frenzy and conflict between members of the evangelical community, furthering division 
among parishioners. Shortly following this shakeup, the Southern Baptist Convention held a 
presidential election in June during an annual meeting in Dallas which resulted in the election of 
J.D. Greear, a 45-year-old pastor from North Carolina, who received 68.6 percent of the vote.80 
 The election of Greear, though a prior mentee of Patterson, represents a transition 
within the SBC from the old guard leadership in a direction largely separated from the views of 
traditional SBC leaders. Greear, the youngest SBC president ever elected, brings vitality and 
youthfulness that reflects an eagerness to approach the issues of the younger generations and 
seeks a departure from previous political involvement. In a response to controversial remarks 
by Patterson concerning female victims of abuse, Greear replied, “Abuse can never be 
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tolerated, minimized, hidden or handled internally… Those in leadership who turn a blind eye 
toward abuse are complicit with it and must be held accountable.”81  
Furthermore, in contrast to other evangelical leaders devoted to furthering the Christian 
mission in American politics and conservativism, Greear is expected to directly confront the 
historical partisan approach of the evangelical community. He has stated, “Our general 
approach is that the church as an organization should not typically get involved in the 
particulars of policy but should limit itself more to teaching the truth….The younger generation 
has a hunger for getting beyond the partisan stuff and saying, ‘What it’s like to follow Jesus in 
2018 and not be a Republican Christian or Democrat social progressive Christian?’”82 Whether a 
strategic move toward winning young Americans, a reckoning with partisan affiliations in the 
past, or a backlash to social progressivism, the SBC is facing a top-down change that will surely 
impact the future of the evangelical movement in America. 
 
The National Association of Evangelicals 
 A second case that validates the shift in evangelicalism in America away from politics 
and potentially toward a strategic approach to reach younger disengaged Americans, is the 
National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). As an evangelical organization, the NAE rivals the 
size and scope of the SBC. Founded in 1942, it includes over 45,000 churches from 40 
denominations and seeks “…to influence society for justice and righteousness and gather the 
many voices of evangelicals together to be more effective for Jesus Christ and his cause.”83 
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Recently, the NAE published similar views to those of SBC President J.D. Greear’s remarks 
concerning politicization. In a winter 2017/2018 article posted on the NAE website, NAE 
President Leith Anderson confronted the issue of politics coupled with evangelicalism. He 
wrote: 
Most international evangelicals today and throughout history have little or no 
knowledge of the details of American politics, Republicans, Democrats, Congress, courts 
or the White House. Most simply, they and we are people of faith who take the Bible 
seriously and believe in Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord.84 
 
Though he warns that evangelicals should not completely disengage from politics, Anderson 
adds, “…let’s not conflate evangelical identity with political identity.”85 His article exemplifies 
evangelical change as its publication, following the 2016 presidential election and before the 
fallout of the SBC leadership change, coincides with more recent conversations about 
evangelicalism in America.  
 Moreover, in January 2018, the NAE published a poll of associated evangelical leaders 
sitting on the NAE Board of Directors posing the question, “Should evangelicals in America be 
identified with the person and policies of President Trump?”86 83% of respondents replied with 
“No” to the question illustrating a telling transition from popular evangelical support for Trump 
during the election toward independence from the President by church leaders a year into his 
presidency.87  
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 Authors contributing to the “Younger Evangelicals” section of the NAE website also 
directly approach the topic of reaching and engaging Millennials and other generations for the 
future. Various articles discuss the characteristics of young generations and ways the church 
can incorporate their strengths to better influence their organization. The NAE’s polling and 
dialogue, isolating from the historically entwined political associations of evangelicalism and 
coupled with a similar approach to engaging Millennials, reflects a parallel movement to the 
SBC. Both organizations are sharing conversations, debates, and internal reflection about the 
future of their congregations and the way the upcoming American populace views and 
understands their faith. This demonstrates a concerted effort to respond to generational 
changes and views in the American landscape and perhaps a direct attempt to engage young 
Americans isolating from religious affiliation. 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
 Data collected for Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 from Pew, PRRI, Gallup, and Barna show a 
continued decrease in the identification of Americans with major faith groups coupled with an 
increasing number of religiously unaffiliated. This data supports Wuthnow and Pew Research 
Center’s observation of declining religious participation in the future based on changes in 
generational religious identification. The continually increasing disengagement of each 
generation, most dramatically exhibited by 34 percent of Generation Z with no religious 
affiliation compared to 13 percent of Boomers at the same age from Figure 1.2, supports the 
hypothesis that the major institutions of religion in America are in decline and will continue to 
be in the future. These changes should provoke, while perhaps not immediate concern, at least 
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further reflection and understanding as major losses in faith group representation will alter the 
civic, social, and political future landscape.  
 The Pew data from Figure 1.5 supports the idea that evangelicals have survived well 
compared to other faith groups and denominations of Christianity. Over time, evangelicals have 
held consistent representation while Christianity overall, specifically Mainline Protestantism, 
has weakened. The high number of Millennials and Generation Z who are religiously unaffiliated 
supports the idea that religious influence is changing in the U.S. Barna’s study on Generation Z 
and an increase in Atheism and non-affiliation coupled with their study on barriers to the faith 
of Millennials and Generation Z points to the impact of social and political differences between 
these generations and older Americans. If the trend of declining faith affiliation continues in 
upcoming generations, and it appears it will, religious influence in American society will rapidly 
shrink as older Americans pass on and fewer and fewer families pass down faith traditions.    
 The Southern Baptist Convention and National Association of Evangelicals studies serve 
as evangelical examples of generational replacement and a shift toward purposefully 
approaching the concerns of upcoming generations. It is a religious response to political and 
social changes in America. The strong data that shows such substantial change in the religious 
landscape, particularly the views and leanings of young Americans, is an undeniable fact that 
Christian denominations must acknowledge. Though evangelicalism has maintained a robust 
following, the shifts in Mainline Protestantism should serve as a fair warning to evangelical 
leaders that their resiliency is not without threat. If political association remains a primary issue 
for upcoming generations, as it appears to be with Millennials and Generation Z, the SBC and 
NAE would do will to continue to distance their organizations from the partisan marketplace. To 
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distance from the political marketplace will likely become increasingly difficult as shrinking 
numbers will put greater pressure on remaining Christians in a growing partisan cultural 
environment. Faith groups will either choose to willingly move toward young Americans in 
approaching generational political, social, and moral views, or they will likely experience a 
continued decline in membership rates.  
 
Conclusion 
 The implications of understanding the changes in American religion are great. Not only 
is the topic an important discussion for major faith leaders and congregants, but also political 
leaders and the greater American populace. Neglecting major losses in religious affiliation has 
the potential to drastically alter the communal, civic, and moral structure of the nation. For if 
religion in America is in decline, it is likely to be replaced by something else. The data analyzed 
in this paper from the last decade, combined with academic literature, supports the hypothesis 
that America’s religious profile is changing rapidly. First, Americans are less likely to affiliate 
with a particular religion and each successive generation is moving away from any religious 
identification. The growing unaffiliated ranks will continue to be supplied by those Americans 
leaving faith groups and, more strongly, by younger Americans who have never subscribed to a 
particular faith.  
 Second, the question of the evangelical future is not as variable as other groups. Though 
Christianity as a whole is clearly in decline, evangelicals have displayed strong resiliency, and 
data from this study support a stable future. However, Millennials and Generation Z will play a 
prominent role in either supporting or refuting this finding. Both of these generations trend 
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toward evangelical disengagement, though not enough recent data exists to clarify this point. 
Generation Z, mostly teenagers, have yet to solidify their religious identifications for adulthood 
and certainly, due to their young age, have not produced any voting data to suggest separation 
or backlash toward religious partisanship. Continued polling of this group will be necessary to 
observe any changes in evangelical membership as it relates to Millennials and Post-Millennials.  
 The third question, why younger generations are shifting from faith is the most difficult 
to answer. Polling of younger generations supports the idea that politically and socially 
Millennials and Post-Millennials differ from older generations including those with the same 
religious beliefs. However, many variables may cumulatively cause the departure of young 
Americans. The SBC and NAE case studies and Barna polling do signal that young parishioners 
are disgruntled by traditional partisan connections and by the view that Christians are 
hypocritical, possibly because of discrepancies between their voting habits and religious beliefs. 
Future studies on the voting habits of secular and religious Millennials and Post-Millennials 
coupled with their views on socially and politically charged issues such as immigration, gay 
rights, and gun control could better illustrate a growing rift between generations. Changes in 
the SBC and NAE are too recent to definitively attribute to a single issue. The future of the SBC 
under Greear’s leadership and the actions of other denominational groups could provide clarity 
to demographic and generational shifts as well as how religious groups respond to a changing 
environment.   
 An April 2017 article published in The Atlantic, referenced the concern of a growing 
culture war between Americans. The author concludes, referencing Kenneth Wald’s work, that 
an emerging movement away from religious affiliation and participation toward secularism in 
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the wake of the 2016 election will result in increased partisanship and intolerance, of which 
both sides of the political spectrum will suffer.88 It is critical both American religious and secular 
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 American Political Polarization and Religion 
  What is changing? 
 
  In the early nineteenth century, German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte described 
the early Christ-followers as unconcerned with terrestrial matters, “Thus the apostles, for 
example, and the earliest Christians in general, were even in life transported wholly beyond the 
earth by their belief in heaven; and they renounced the affairs of the world—state, fatherland 
and nation—so completely that they no longer deemed these worthy of their attention.”89 
Much has changed since the first church in how religious followers address the doings and 
direction of the state. The Western, and current American, descendent Church of the early 
Christian apostles has departed greatly from an eternal focus like those of its ancestors and 
embraced a more committed and purposeful role in the secular business of the nation and its 
politics.  
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Today, certain American Christian groups represent a strong political demographic with 
a unified approach in ensuring their mores are reflected in American society and government. 
This is most evident in the surety of the evangelical voting bloc, particularly in the 2016 
presidential election, where white American evangelicals overwhelmingly supported then-
candidate Donald Trump at 81 percent in lock-step and very much concerned with the direction 
of the nation.90 In an increasingly polarized and tribal society, Americans in identifiable groups, 
political or religious, are ensuring their views are an actionable part of the democratic 
conversation.  
This chapter addresses the relationship between political polarization and religious 
identification. What does growing partisanship do to religious association in America and how 
do these two spheres influence one another? Ultimately, this chapter will examine political 
polarization’s effect on religious reorganization or decline cited in the first installment of this 
project.  
 Chapter one focused on the changing landscape of American religious affiliation. 
Conclusively, Americans are shedding traditional religious labels. Though overall American faith 
groups are in decline, evangelicals—by retaining their followers—and religious “nones” (those 
with no religious affiliation) are growing. Researchers and academics point to a myriad of 
reasons for this shift but younger generations leaving the faith prominently cite frustration with 
faith-based political alignment. Regardless of affiliation voters young and old must confront the 
social, political, and religious challenges before them in the way that best helps them explain 
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the world. If religion, in the context of this study, represents the way one reconciles how things 
should be, what one cares about, and existential purpose, perhaps Americans are simply 
trading one type of affiliation for another. This study will explore American voters, both those 
affiliated with a traditional faith group and those with no affiliation, to determine how politics is 
affecting religious identity.    
 As affiliation with traditional faith groups declines and nones grow, politically Americans 
are ideologically moving further apart. In seven polls conducted between 1994 and 2017, Pew 
Research Center found a widening partisan divide between Americans which accelerated from 
2016 to 2017.91 This study found party affiliation diverging at a greater rate than other social 
identifiers and greater splits on political views related to government aid, racial discrimination, 
immigration, and diplomacy than at any other time.92 Another Pew study from October 2019, 
revealed more divisive and negative attitudes toward opposing political party members. It 
showed 78 percent of members in both the Democrat and Republican parties believe party 
divisions are growing and 73 percent of those polled believe the two party’s disagreements 
extend beyond policy interests to views on “basic facts” revealing a sharp uptick in polarization 
since 2016.93 Furthermore, members of opposing parties are more likely than ever to see each 
other as immoral and less patriotic.94 
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 Adjacent on Pew’s website is a publication regarding the aforementioned changes in 
American religious affiliation. Recent studies show an increasing population of religious nones 
in the United States. The first chapter cites a 2012 Pew Research study where respondents self-
identified with no religious affiliation at 15.3 percent in 2007 and 19.6 percent in 2012 and a 
2015 study showing 25.4 percent of Americans identified as evangelical Christian.95 In a recently 
released separate but related poll, Pew found Americans identifying as either atheist, agnostic, 
or none, rose 9 percent in the general population since 2009.96  
Given the rising levels of partisan division and religious non-affiliation, perhaps an 
identifiable relationship exists between these two movements. Two specific groups will be 
examined to better explore the question. A 2018 General Social Survey (GSS) poll showed nones 
at 23.1 percent of the population and evangelicals at 22.8 percent revealing a first that nones 
have closed the gap to evangelicals, the largest faith group in America, in overall size.97 If nones 
numerically equal or surpass evangelicals in representation then their political footprint will be 
telling in understanding religious and political change. If nones are as homogenous as 
evangelicals on certain political issues and candidates, and as a voting bloc, this comparison 
could signify a shift in the way Americans define themselves.  
The politically separating environment and the increasing rate of religious disaffiliation 
are both clear and evidenced factors. Much has been written and studied on these two 
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observations; however, it is necessary to determine if and how these occurrences are 
connected. It is critical to understand the impact on the political and religious future of America 
given these dynamics. As religious Americans shape the way they vote and determine proper 
governance, by and through their faith, the rise of the nones and their political voice may 
fundamentally alter the traditional lens by which religion and politics are understood. 
Moreover, with greater value placed on political loyalty over religious identification, 
traditionally religious Americans themselves may also be trading religion for politics as they 
assign greater importance to political matters and party association than religion. The speed 
and intensity at which Americans are moving apart politically combined with the loss of 
religious identity suggests a link and may reveal a change in how the populace sees and explains 
the world. In its most practical and worldly sense, if religion is a collection of beliefs and 
purpose to give meaning and direction to life, then it is feasible Americans are finding this more 
so in their political identities than inside the walls of a church.   
 
Literature Review 
Much recent scholarship has addressed the pervasive and observable partisan trend in 
many facets of American society and government. The 2016 presidential election with its vitriol, 
though certainly not a single data point, revealed deeply entrenched fractures between both 
parties and awareness of division in the general electorate. Partisanship and polarization are 
not synonymous terms as the former corresponds to growing dissonance between parties and 
the latter to more ideological divergence. However, for this study, the overall growing political 
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division is used as a whole and more or less equally to denote a gap regardless of a specific 
party or ideological difference.  
 In addition to noting a deeper partisan split in the 114th Congress than in any previous 
Congress over the past 100 years, a recent compilation found evidence of partisan division in 
political parties, the judiciary, state and federal government, and the executive.98 Most 
germane to this study is the electorate’s partisanship and the self-identified none or evangelical 
voter. Evidence shows American voters are increasingly distancing themselves along the 
political spectrum. A 2012 study found 91 percent of presidential election voters maintained 
party lines while only 7 percent voted apart from their registered party, signifying the highest 
level of partisanship in the poll’s 60-year history.99 Politically, voters are quickly widening by 
party and platform. Political Scientist Alan I. Abramowitz writes, “the distributions of ideological 
positions, policy preferences, and even candidate evaluations have become increasingly 
polarized with fewer Democrats and Republicans found near the center and more found near 
the opposing attitudinal poles.”100 Abramowitz adds a key observation and finding that division 
among the American electorate is not solely ideological but extends to deep cultural, social, and 
racial differences.101 This may suggest that party assignment or political identification serves as 
a critical label that Americans use to clearly and easily explain what is most important to them. 
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In other words, perhaps it is becoming easier to more accurately and completely describe 
oneself in terms of a party or political lens than a religious tag.  
 Countering Abramowitz’s findings, Nolan McCarty, in a recently published book, cites 
various scholars and studies that conclude the mass population diverging politically is a 
misnomer as the public is simply better sorted into political or partisan camps. McCarty 
references research findings that Americans have sustained similarly strong views on certain 
political issues over time but have better aligned these views with others, “along ideological 
and social identity lines.”102 Whether sorting or actual ideological divergence, researchers have 
reiterated the matters noted by Abramowitz that separate voters: social, racial, and cultural 
issues.103 Perhaps the rationale or definition matters less to the question at hand than the 
outcome or effect. Further separation of the public or more sorting will continue to drive 
Americans into well-defined identities especially if the lines between religious affiliation and 
social or racial views are blurred or nonexistent. 
 From a governance standpoint, McCarty suggests the current environment and 
President Trump’s political strategy and rhetoric creates and highlights division among groups 
and will accelerate sorting potentially leading to government gridlock and public dissatisfaction 
and distrust in democratic institutions.104 The growing political gap, coupled with bitter 
partisanship, will likely result in disastrous effects for social and community solidarity perhaps 
breaking down some traditional religious affiliations while also stoking and entrenching the 
political arm of some faith groups.  
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Shifting to religious identity, much has been studied and written on the recent trend of 
the rise of the nones and the reasoning behind Americans leaving their faiths. Robert D. 
Putnam and David E. Campbell found, in a sweeping study of American religion and politics, 
young generations were cutting religious ties due to “the association between religion and 
conservative politics.”105 Research conducted between 2006 and 2011 reinforced the 
assumption none growth was due to the mixture of politics and religion and the impact of the 
Religious Right movement.106 This explanation for the rise of the nones in the past few years 
has been echoed by various researchers and academics. Michael Hout and Claude S. Fisher 
addressed the question directly in a 2002 study which attempted to explain the dramatic 
doubling of American nones from 7% in 1991 to 14% in 1998.107 Like Putnam and Campbell, 
Hout and Fisher cited generational replacement as a reason but found the primary explanation 
was an aversive reaction to Christian political affiliation with the GOP by moderate Mainline 
Protestants and lukewarm religious observers.108 The authors note their findings revealed a 
distinct trend attributive to the political and religious associations of the 1990s.109 The key 
observation at the turn of the century was the relationship between the polarized political 
environments affecting the traditionally understood boundaries of religious affiliation.  
 Hout and Fisher’s research also confronts a common misperception that religious nones 
are largely secular atheists, agnostics, or at least indifferent to religion. They show few nones 
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fall under these labels, most pray and have “opted out” of organized religion while still 
retaining spiritual practices and views.110 Furthermore, they found no evidence in any part of 
their study that suggested nones hold no religious beliefs.111 One study found, although the 
growth of the nones may initially appear to point to secularization, only 5% of the general 
population claims no spiritual belief, far below the percentage of overall American nones.112 
The fact that nones retain forms of religiosity while departing organized religion for political 
purposes may indicate political views are supplanting religious affiliation as the primary 
American identity. The authors conclude a continued and increasingly polarized political climate 
will further isolate moderates, embolden the left and right, and institutionalize the left from 
religious affiliates on the right.113 Though religion and politics have always intertwined 
throughout American history, researchers and political scientists have noted a distinct 
relationship between religious affiliation and the growing partisanship of the American 
electorate in recent years to support the replacement theory.  
 In addition to noting the dropout of the “moderate religious middle” Putnam and 
Campbell found Americans are self-sorting into communities based on political and social 
values rather than religious connections.114 They show, in comparing various party voters and 
platforms to traditional religious voters, greater polarization and discord between political 
parties than religious groups.115 In other words, there was greater disagreement and 
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dissonance between competing political parties than between any two faith groups. Moreover, 
Putnam and Campbell argued the binding agent between partisanship and religious beliefs 
were two main issues: abortion and same-sex marriage.116 Their findings suggest Americans 
hold deeper or more entrenched beliefs on certain political issues than any religious principles. 
With increasingly polar views on more recent inflammatory issues such as climate change and 
gun control, party separation could mark the transition to political views as the driving social 
wedge between Americans rather than deeply held religious beliefs or any other identifiable 
characteristic.  
 In a more recent article, in part, by David Campbell published in 2018, the authors 
support this very claim writing the “effect of political orientations on religious and secular 
characteristics is often stronger than the reverse effect.”117 The contributors reinforce Hout and 
Fisher’s findings and offer the alignment of religion and politics produces partisanship and 
feeds polarization forcing conservatives and Republicans further right while Democrats and 
liberals become more secular and further left as a response.118 A growing section of academic 
and sociological researchers and scholars is labeling politics as the causal factor for changes in 
the American religious landscape. This connection and causality are also evident in voting 
records and characteristics of traditional religious groups. In more recent presidential elections 
of 2008, 2012, and 2016, religious and non-religious voters split sharply along party lines and 
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voted overwhelmingly in alignment with their group affiliations.119 As Americans over the last 
thirty years have become more partisan, the way they identify themselves in terms of religious 
assignment has changed as a result. This change is attributed more so to how Americans view 
the other party and less in the way they view correct policy practices.120 This trend may drive 
Americans to consider first and foremost their political roots and afterward apply any input 
from religious association or identification.  
 Michele Margolis, in her book From Politics to Pews, argues partisanship driving religion 
is the new norm for understanding the relationship between religion and politics in America. 
She argues the conventional understanding that an individual’s religious preference is the 
reference point for political and party affiliation has been upended. Margolis shows that 
partisan ideology from an earlier beginning arrests the identity and worldview of American 
voters and determines how they later interact with and assign to religions.121 This occurs as 
younger generations, already steeped in political leanings from their parents and upbringing, 
enter adulthood and affiliate with a religious community in alignment with their more stable 
and longer-held partisan ideology. As they age, their core ideology will continue to influence 
their voting habits, views on issues, and non-religious decisions far into the future much less 
than the influence of their more recent religious affiliation.122  
 In addition to younger political generations putting on a religious label at age, religion 
can also help push politically apathetic voters toward partisan inclinations with less effort. 
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Margolis claims a vast majority of Americans care little about politics and are lazy to build 
individual platforms or cases for strong political stances. Religious group affiliation can offer a 
short-cut to crafting political positions and can “reduce the costs of forming political decisions” 
while building a standpoint “without much cognitive effort.”123 Essentially, if the members of a 
church imply and espouse a particular political view, less politically engaged members quite 
simply pick up that view to associate with community norms. This produces homogenous voting 
and greater alignment between a particular political identity and a religious faith group.  
 Escalating partisanship and the infusion of politics into religion can also influence the 
internal dynamics of a particular faith group. Partisan identity can grow inside of religious sects. 
Where traditionally churches may have encapsulated a range of political views, they are 
transitioning to more entrenched and like-minded political stances creating echo chambers.124 
The trend of partisanship in both the political sphere and inside of various churches and 
religious faiths is a self-feeding movement. Entrenchment drives both religious and non-
religious Americans into politically compatible camps further exacerbating the partisan divide 
inside and outside of religious factions. Simply, a splintering of affiliations on either side of the 
political spectrum is occurring in both religious and non-religious spheres. If partisan ideology 
and politics now drive the religious identity, of moderates, conservative evangelicals, and 
liberal nones, how does this change the understanding and theoretical framework of religion in 
America? If politics is the new religion for all, what does this mean? 
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 One approach to consider is a long-held framework to describe the blend of religion and 
politics in America. In 1967 sociologist Robert Bellah introduced to the American context the 
term civil religion as an underlying and foundational American political religion. He defined it as 
a “set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals”125 that reinforced the spiritual destiny of the American 
government and the unifying conviction of American purpose. Bellah referenced President 
Lincoln and Kennedy’s use of religious rhetoric in political speeches to illustrate a distinct civil 
belief that acts in much the same ways as a religious faith to influence the electorate. He 
defined the spiritualization of politics and the deep communal binding of Americans to the 
destiny of the American spirit. Though American civil religion represents a uniquely American 
characteristic and phenomenon, the concept of spiritualizing politics is not limited to 
democracies alone or the West. Politics as religion has been demonstrated in Bolshevism, 
Nazism, fascism, and totalitarianism, to a more detrimental and ruinous effect.126 Emilio Gentile 
writes the act of sacralizing politics, in essence, takes “the prerogative to determine the 
meaning and fundamental aim of human existence for individuals and to the collectivity, at 
least on this earth.”127 In this way, politics supplants religion by becoming an earthly purpose or 
motivation for life pursuits.  
 Mark Chaves in explaining the power of religious authority in political society shows 
control is obtained either by “deliverance from sickness, meaninglessness, poverty, desire, sin, 
or other undesirable conditions” or by positive promises or offerings.128 As Americans diverge 
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from each other and imbed their identity in political camps they may be exchanging the 
terrestrial aims of traditional religious groups for the power in identity, purpose, and worldview 
of political affiliations. Andrew Sullivan argues the replacement theory of religion for politics in 
a New York magazine article in which he opens, “everyone has a religion” and a practice that 
dictates the decisions in one’s life.129 Sullivan includes non-religious Americans in this trend 
who profess their faith in some sort of belief in truth independent of traditional religion. He 
explains the decline of religion in America, and specifically, Christianity, as merely those same 
feelings and associations transferred to and “expressed by political cults.”130 This has caused an 
escalation in political partisanship as Christianity “tamed” religious expression in the past. 
Sullivan, a Catholic himself, reasons the rise of liberalism has prompted this void previously 
filled by Christianity and argues the Christian impact on politics has historically helped tolerate 
and diffuse disagreement and theological differences in American society.131  
This argument contradicts the work of Margolis and Campbell that partisanship 
primarily creates division and in turn religious affiliation or non-affiliation. However, Sullivan’s 
article supports the overarching idea that all Americans search for, accept, and act on a 
particular belief or goal that explains the world and gives life purpose. When viewed with 
Margolis’ and Campbell’s work in mind, increasing partisanship and the equally divided political 
spectrum between leftist nones and conservatively aligned evangelicals may demonstrate 
politics as religion in the current environment.  
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Robert Bellah’s observation of American civil religion was that of a unifying faith in 
political destiny and collective American identity. At its core, civil religion could be used to tie 
Americans to one another under God to common goals and belief in the experiment of 
American democracy. Perhaps the previously understood definition of civil religion is changing 
to one not by which presidents petition for American unity but toward two distinct civil political 
religions on the left and right. Each as firmly planted in a political belief to map the way forward 
for the American government as the other and each as tinged with the characteristics and 
communal belief of a religious worldview as the other, regardless of religious or non-religious 
identities. These emerging and ever-diverging religions are best understood or explained as 
political divisions but carry the power, influence, and commitment to ideals as any major faith 
group. If politics drive religion, and politics are a religion for the followers of political ideologies, 
then these two competing civil religions, one right, one left, will act as disruptive rather than 
amalgamative forces in the American political and social context further isolating Americans 
from one another.   
 
Methodology 
 This study utilizes various polling data to better address how political polarization may 
be affecting trends in religious affiliation. More specifically, religious nones and evangelicals will 
be key focus groups due to their near-equal representation in the American general population 
from the previously referenced 2018 GSS poll. These two groups may represent similar blocs on 
both the liberal and conservative end of the political spectrum in terms of applying social and 
cultural values and beliefs in their political camps. There is something critically important in 
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investigating how these two identities, seemingly dissimilar in their religious character, 
compare and contrast politically. This study will utilize polls, primarily from Pew Research 
Group, which look at the overall representation of nones and evangelicals in both the 
Democratic and Republican Parties as well as overall voter registration. The way nones and 
evangelicals demonstrate their beliefs and core values at the ballot box and in their views on 
social and cultural issues speaks volumes to understanding if partisanship and politics are 
becoming a stronger identifier and factor for American identity than religious faith. 
 
Data Presentation 
First, it is necessary to explore how polarization and division in both the Republican and 
Democratic parties have changed over time. Generally, both the Republican and Democratic 
parties are more demographically split than ever due to separations along racial, socioeconomic 
status, education level, and generational lines. A recent collaborative study in part compiled by 
the Center for American Progress stated, “the 2016 election was the most demographically 
divisive election in the past 36 years” with parties more divided than at any other modern 
time.132 Demographic differences alone do not explain partisan differences. A Pew Research 
study, published in 2017, utilized a ten-topic political value questionnaire to measure 
ideological differences of voters since 1994. This study found the gap of political values 
between Republicans and Democrats had separated and grown by over 15 percentage points 
since the beginning of the study and far outweighed political differences classified by 
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demographics.133 Simply, Americans are more divided along party lines than by race, education, 
age, or gender.  
 Given the sharp partisan split as well as demographic differences, it should come as no 
surprise that changing demographic composition reflects religious compositional changes as 
well. A stronger shift or change over time in this category could show religious affiliation, or 
lack thereof, as a greater force for political assignment and affect inside each party.  
 
Evangelicals, Nones, and the Republican Party 
 Pew’s expansive study on party identification over 24 years, in addition to other 
organizational trends, provides a critical look at the changing nature of the parties due to 
religious association. This study included 253 total surveys of over 340,000 respondents over 
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    Source: Pew Research Center. Graph compiled by the author. 
 
Turning first to the Republican Party, white evangelical Protestants from Figure 2.1, comprise 
roughly a third of the party and grew four points to 35 percent from 2000 to 2016.135 
Evangelicals, the most stable and relied upon affiliation, inside of the GOP never dipped below 
30 percent since Pew began its study. Their consistency in the Party and their slight growth over 
time shows—given the dramatic rise of unaffiliated voters in recent years—evangelicals are 
growing inside of the Republican Party just by remaining solid in a more sorted and polarized 
environment. Pew’s study evidentially supports the idea that white evangelicals are a relied 
upon and foundational identity of the Republican Party and are growing in number and 
influence. 
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In congruence with the overall rise of religious nones in the general population, nones 
have also gained some ground inside the Republican Party. Since 2004, nones doubled their 
footprint in the Party from six to 12 percent by 2016.136 At first glance, none growth appears as 
foothold gaining inside the Party, but given the total expansion of nones in the political 
environment and balanced against the results in the Democratic Party, this is more likely 
attributed to an overall reduction of faith group assignment in the American voting population. 
Nones are growing in both parties but the rate of growth in the Democratic Party reveals a new 
liberal voting bloc strength reflective of evangelical Protestantism’s hold inside of the GOP.  
 
Evangelicals, Nones, and the Democratic Party 
 
Figure 2.2—Percentage of Democratic or Democratic-Leaning Voters by 













   Source: Pew Research Center. Graph compiled by the author.  
                                                 
136 Pew Research Center, “The Parties on the Eve of the 2016 Election: Two Coalitions, Moving Further Apart,” Pew 
Research Center: U.S. Politics & Policy. 
 
  59 
Figure 2.2 shows a clear transition where the percentage of nones in the Democratic 
Party composition increases and eclipses the reducing number of white evangelical Protestants 
over time indicating more dramatic change inside of the Democratic Party than the Republican 
Party from Figure 2.1. This is most evident between 2000 and 2008 as nones double, in two 
election cycles, from nine percent of the Democratic Party to 18 percent in 2008.137 This growth 
continues at a similar rate as nones reach their highest level in 2016 representing over a 
quarter of all registered Democratic voters.138  
The rise of nones in the Democratic Party reflects a similar representation of 
evangelicals, at least in terms of size and makeup, in the Republican Party. Meanwhile, since 
1996 the white evangelical population of the Democratic Party halved by 2016 at only eight 
percent, the second-lowest population of the eight faith affiliations included in the surveys.139 
In the same reflective manner, white evangelical Protestants as part of the Democratic Party at 
eight percent are less than five percentage points from the population of nones inside of the 
GOP at 12 percent in 2016 from Figure 2.1. The dramatic rise of nones in the Democratic Party 
necessitates the question; where are nones coming from? The answer may be found in the 
trending representation of Catholics and Mainline Protestants inside of the parties.  
Pew Research, in the same study, showed white Catholics in the Republican Party 
dropped only two percentage points from 20 to 18 in the ten-year window.140 Catholics, like 
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evangelical Protestants, have held a strong albeit smaller representation inside of the 
Republican Party over time. White Catholics made up 22 percent of the Democratic Party in 
1996, that percentage split in half to 10 percent by 2016 suggesting previous Catholic affiliates 
may have become nones inside of the Party but likely not from the Republican ranks.141 
Mainline Protestants, as a defined faith, represent the most fluid group and could be the main 
supplier and explanation for greater numbers of nones. Like Catholic Democrats, white 
Mainline Protestants went from a quarter of the party in 1996 to only 11 percent in 2016.142 On 
the Republican side of the aisle, white Mainline Protestants have continued to shrink over time 
from 29 percent of the Party to only 17 percent in the measured decade.143 This data means 
many Mainline Protestants inside of the Democratic Party have dropped their religious identity 
and likely rebranded as nones. Furthermore, given their dramatic reduction inside of the 
Republican Party, Mainline Protestants are also likely becoming Democrats and perhaps also 
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Overall voter representation by faith group also indicates a change in the electorate and 
how religion and politics interact. In Pew’s study, since 1996, white evangelicals as a voting 
base have maintained their political presence as a group only dipping four percentage points by 
2016.144 White Mainline Protestants and White Catholics, two traditionally large voting faith 
groups, experienced significant decreases in voter registration in a decade losing 12 and 8 
points respectively, three times and two times the decline of evangelicals.145 The most dramatic 
delta belongs to the increase in voters identifying as religious nones which more than doubled 
from eight percent in 2006 to 21 percent in 2016.146 Based on this data, it is clear Catholics and 
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Mainline Protestants are either shrinking in number as faith groups in America and becoming 
less politically engaged, or are shifting their affiliation to the none category.  
 
Faith Group Polarization 
 In comparing the evangelical and none categories within the two parties, are these 
groups separating ideologically on the political spectrum? Are evangelicals driving Republicans 
right toward conservatism while nones drive the Democratic Party left? Recent studies suggest 
the more politically liberal the more likely to have no religious affiliation. Furthermore, while 
moving right on the spectrum, the number of nones decreases with each checkpoint, meaning 
the more conservative, the more religiously affiliated.147 Using exit poll data from the 2000, 
2004, and 2008 presidential elections, Pew observed religious none support for the Democratic 
candidate grew with each election and reached 75 percent in 2008.148 From Pew’s 
comprehensive Religious Landscape Study, politically conservative evangelicals had become 
more conservative in their views on abortion and homosexuality during the 2000s while nones 
had become more liberal on the same issues.149 Though this may at first glance indicate these 
groups are pushing the extremes of each party, it must be noted that generally Americans and 
the parties themselves have moved further left and right over time.  
In a recent Gallup study on the Democratic Party, polling showed the Party as a whole, 
as well as all sub-demographics, has become more liberal on various issues over the past two 
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decades.150 Meanwhile, the Republican Party is more sharply conservative than it was in the 
1970s. Data pulled from a General Social Survey showed self-identified Republicans placed 
themselves on a 0 to 100 increasing scale of conservatism just above 60 percent in 1976, in the 
past decade that percentage passed 70 percent.151 Considering previously noted polarization 
and general ideological shifts toward the ends of the political spectrum for both parties nones 
and evangelicals are not solely to blame for temperature changes in party views. While the 
parties separate and the partisan gap grows, both religious and non-religious factions inside the 
parties are accountable for the shift.  
 
Analysis and Discussion 
 Pew Research leads data collection and analysis on the study of religion and politics in 
the modern era. Data collected from their multiple expansive studies lends clarity to this 
subject. Figure 2.1 shows the evangelical demographic has held strong inside the Republican 
Party which continues to move right and away from the Democratic Party. Evangelicals remain 
not only an integral—but perhaps the strongest—conservative demographic and known 
commodity in the Republican Party. Because they have remained so stable amidst movement of 
other demographic groups over time, evangelicals have grown their numbers, clout, and 
influence in the Party and represent a coherent political voting bloc. Evangelical stability in 
voter registration also strongly reinforces this claim from the data displayed in Figure 2.3. Due 
to evangelical staying power in the GOP during other Christian reassignment, this fact likely 
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means evangelicals will increasingly align themselves with and interact more in Republican 
politics as the wave of religious decline approaches their pews.  
In contrast, in terms of faith group representation, the Democratic Party has 
experienced greater variability than the Republican Party. The dramatic uptick in the number of 
nones in one decade from 10 to 29 percent, indicated in Figure 2.2, illustrates this point. 
Considering the reduction in voter registration of Mainline Protestants and Catholics from 
Figure 2.3 combined with the sharp uptick of registered nones, these two Christian groups are 
losing their faith but retaining political influence as nones in the Democratic Party. This data is 
supportive of Hout and Fisher’s thesis that more politically liberal or centrist Christians are 
dropping their religious affiliation in response to the evangelical unification with the Republican 
Party and conservative politics. As these trends continue, more moderate Christians will likely 
become nones leading to an entrenching of staunch evangelicals on the right and ongoing 
growth of secular nones in the Democratic Party.  
 
Conclusion 
 Broadly, this study shows and observes major shifts in religious affiliation and its 
relation to the American political landscape. The relationship between politics and religion is 
changing as faith group population decline and political polarization interact. However, exactly 
how these two subjects impact one another is less clear but the presented data does provide 
some insight. Of all data analyzed in this paper, most applicable to the research question is the 
movement of white Mainline Protestants and white Catholics. These groups are most likely a 
supplier of nones in the Democratic Party and represent the most observable movement in 
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terms of political affiliation and religious identification. This study, with more recent polling 
data, seemingly supports Hout and Fisher’s thesis, as well as others (Campbell, Putnam, and to 
an extent Margolis) in the literature review, that the rise of nones is an aversion to evangelical 
alignment with an increasingly conservative Republican Party. Given greater polarization, in the 
parties, the data in this paper shows prior Mainline Protestants and Catholics, likely political 
moderates or centrists, are reassigning as nones and Democrats while the presence of 
evangelical Christians in a more politically conservative Republican Party continues to build. 
While the parties and Americans become more polarized religious assignment is being altered.  
 More generally, the original question of exactly how partisanship explains religious 
affiliation or religious affiliation explains partisanship is too complicated to determine with the 
data from this study. It becomes a chicken or the egg dilemma to definitively state how one 
drives the other. However, research from the literature review is clear that politics are more 
acceptably understood as the current driver of religion or lack thereof. Further, as religion 
declines and polarization increases, both political parties are experiencing dramatic internal 
shifts. As nones become more Democratic and evangelicals become more Republican it is 
increasingly difficult to separate the identities. In other words, has the term “evangelical” 
become so fused to the Republican Party that it is for political and spiritual purposes the same?  
If America is entering an era of a new of type civil religion, as described by Robert Bellah, is it 
too early and too complex to tell? The question of how Americans identify themselves, 
however, is critical to assessing the future outlook of American faith and politics, though it 
cannot be definitively answered in this project.  
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 Additional studies should be conducted focusing on how Americans identify themselves 
concerning politics or religion, their overall worldview that shapes their beliefs and actions, and 
how politics and religion play a role in their daily lives. Studies on American social media activity 
and media consumption, classified as either religious or political, may help answer this 
question. Polling which separates more effectively nones and other religious labels and their 
political views would also bring clarity to this question and help assess if religious voters or 
secular voters are pushing the parties to the ends of the ideological spectrum.  
The welding together of religion and politics is an occurrence some religious leaders and 
generally, most Americans, find worrisome. Timothy Keller, a prominent and influential 
evangelical leader, pastor, and author, on the subject of partisanship and Christianity, writes 
that many American Christians are more influenced by political content online through social 
media and other platforms than by Scripture and time in communal worship. He explains: 
The way I have put it is that faith is often subordinated to partisan politics and political 
ideology, with the latter being the prism through which too many Christians interpret 
the former. Too many Christians are characterized by their tribal commitments, rather 
than an understanding of justice and human teleology.152 
 
It appears, from a religious perspective, the inseparable identity of a political Christian risks 
Christian nature itself.   
Americans in general desire religion to be an integral part of American life but still be 
restrained by appropriate political separation. A recent Pew poll reported 55 percent of 
Americans believe religion does more good than harm in society while only 20 percent believe 
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it harms society.153 Meanwhile, 63 percent want politics separate from religion while 76 
percent believe churches should not favor certain political candidates.154 The question of effect 
and how politics may be driving, or perhaps replacing, religious identity is of fundamental 
importance. At risk is the traditional practice of American church and state separation which 
could produce long-term threats to the main mission of major American faith groups and 
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 Politics as Faith 
  A New American Civil Religion  
 
 On the evening of June 1, 2020, President Trump performed arguably the strongest 
political act, bathed in religious symbolism, of his presidency. In brashness, unpredictability, 
and magnitude of response, it stands to markedly define his time in office. The scene in 
Washington D.C. after three consecutive days of protests following the death of George Floyd 
presented a complex environment of tension with many players including multiple law 
enforcement agencies, hundreds of protesters, and national discord surrounding racial 
injustice.  
 It was in this environment, after proclaiming the importance of “law and order” in a 
nationally televised speech, that the President made his way toward Lafayette Square along a 
route recently cleared by law enforcement using pepper balls and smoke. At the front steps of 
the St. John’s Episcopal Church, of which the basement was burned by protesters the night 
before, Ivanka Trump handed the President a Bible which he held high in his hand for 
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photographs.155 At a time of national social unrest and worldwide pandemic, the event was 
catalytic and prompted immediate and overwhelming media attention, editorials, and discourse 
regarding civil-military relations, the appropriate use of law enforcement, First Amendment 
protections, and the intersection of religion and politics.  
 Some have written the Trump Bible photo-op was a calculated act designed to reassure 
his base, evangelicals in particular, of his commitment to their interests.156 This explanation 
seems increasingly accurate given the Defense Secretary’s subsequent admission that he was 
unaware of the walk’s endpoint and purpose and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs’ mea culpa 
for appearing in the photo-op event.157  
This project has continued to reference an overarching statistic that Trump carried 81% 
of the white evangelical vote in the 2016 presidential election. The continued strong evangelical 
defense of Trump has been difficult for academics, pundits, and religious observers to fully 
explain given his marital history, business tactics, posture toward opponents and speech, and 
lack of familiarity or observance of Christian mores. On the campaign trail, the Access 
Hollywood revelation, Trump’s reference to “Two Corinthians,” and his statements that he 
doesn’t need to ask for forgiveness from God contrasted starkly with deeply held evangelical 
beliefs. During the St. John’s Episcopal Church photograph, a reporter asked if the Bible Trump 
was holding up was his personal Bible, the President replied, “It’s a Bible.”158  
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Trump has continued to rely heavily on the unwavering and dependable bloc of 
evangelical voters. He has earned a faithful following, in a distinctly different way than previous 
politicians, by shrouding himself in religious overtones while defying personal biblical practices. 
The St. John’s Bible photo presents a crucial reflection point and perhaps Trump’s height of 
politics catered to and fused with religion. Evangelical Christians proclaim the authoritative 
power of Scripture, the same Bible held up by Trump, as a foundational tenet. President 
Trump’s photo-op at a time of civil unrest regarding racial inequality could serve as a starkly 
drawn line between observing religious evangelicals and political evangelicals. Is Trump’s 
popularity with evangelicals indicative of a greater American shift toward political priorities and 
power? Are Americans replacing their once traditional spiritual affiliations with political 
assignments and beliefs? This singular event may signal the context of the changing landscape 
of politics and religion in America. Given the findings in previous chapters of the strength and 
rise of the evangelical community in the Republican Party, the rise of the nones and alignment 
with the Democratic Party, and the coupling of both with the overall increase of polarization, 
this reflection point could show how politics is replacing or outpacing traditional religion.  
While much ink has been spilled on attempting to explain why so many evangelicals 
voted for and continue to defend Trump, this chapter aims to explore the possibility of the rise 
and evolution of civil religion introduced in the previous chapter. Is the outcome or effect of 
declining traditional religious affiliation with greater separation on the political spectrum two 
distinct and competing civil religions? In other words, are Americans replacing spiritual faiths 
with a type of politically focused religion? Perhaps a religion that is civil or secular in purpose 
that seeks to plant a particular political worldview in government, one on the left or one on the 
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right. Further, a possible schism between evangelicals on supporting Trump could reveal two 
forms of evangelicalism; one that prioritizes political power and assigns to civil religion and one 
that prioritizes traditional religious beliefs over political wins. 
Chapter two referenced sociologist Robert Bellah’s 1967 observance of a unique 
American Civil Religion (ACR) that served as a unifying phenomenon upholding and framing 
American ideals in the language of Judeo-Christianity. This civil religion provided a bonding 
identity to various groups of Americans for the common cause of patriotic support for American 
values. This project diverges from Bellah’s traditional definition of a unifying force by asking if 
civil religion is or has become a political worldview related to religion in the way that it gives 
purpose to the individual life through collective effort. An effort to direct America in the way it 
should be. By this definition, both left and right civil religions provide meaning and significance 
for their followers that require allegiance to beliefs (political platforms or issues) and little 
leniency for those who do not strictly follow the core tenets. As the traditional religious beliefs 
of certain faith groups or denominations previously provided common identity and exclusivity, 
political tribes or civil religions now do the same.  
 If this is true, the implications could unravel the traditional understanding of how faith 
interacts with politics. Two competing, and perhaps growing, civil religions could have the 
power to further divide Americans into tribal camps leaving little common ground in the 
middle. In this sense, Bellah’s description of a unifying force may have evolved into a divisive 
one that combines the power of both political and religious fault lines with an outcome sure to 
harm American solidarity. 
 
 
  72 
Literature Review 
 Though the theory of civil religion far preceded Robert Bellah’s essay—the term has 
roots in Rousseau and Roman citizenry—Bellah helped shape the concept for the American 
experience and placed it into professional and academic consideration. He focused on its social 
power to invoke unity which is why his article opened with a nod to Kennedy’s inaugural 
address. Presidential inaugurations, particularly those following a change of party control, are 
ripe environments for the president to unify the nation after an election cycle in a path forward 
that includes all Americans. A blend of religious sentiment, pointing to the roots of the 
American founding under a Supreme being, with the stated ideals of the founding documents 
provides power and leverage to bring together the nation. Philip Gorski, a Yale University 
professor and student of Bellah’s, has noted Bellah defined ACR as a meshing of religious 
narrative and terminology with American ideals and values influenced by the Enlightenment. 
Gorski writes later Bellah became perhaps discouraged with the theory in practice calling it an 
“empty and broken shell.”159 
 This could be explained by cultural fracturing amidst the civil rights era and the Vietnam 
experience that greatly divided Americans. For this reason and others, ACR has been difficult to 
identify and define and has been described as episodic or evolutionary over time. For this work, 
it is necessary to attempt to build coherent framing that helps to identify and then measure if 
civil religion is forming into two competing political beliefs. Based on historical and present 
ambiguity surrounding ACR and opinions on exactly what it entails, this is no easy task. 
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Historically, civil religion has come in and out of focus in academia and scholarship. Soon 
after Bellah’s essay in the late 1960s, civil religion became a sociological topic that garnered 
much interest and study. Sociologists, in particular, attempted to identify, test, and measure 
the theory of civil religion. In 1972 Michael Thomas and Charles Flippen published their findings 
of a study designed to test Bellah’s theory. Their model focused on analyzing published 
editorials in various newspapers following the Honor America Day rally held on July 4th, 1970 in 
downtown Washington D.C. They posited the rally, which featured recorded comments by 
President Nixon and an opening speech by evangelist Billy Graham, would result in key terms or 
mentions of Bellah’s hypothesis being published in the subsequent papers.160 Thomas and 
Flippen sought to match similar phraseology in editorials following a ripe event for ACR to 
Bellah’s description of civil religion. Ultimately, they were able to find no empirical evidence to 
support Bellah’s claim of ACR but they also concluded their method utilized indirect testing, and 
more study would be needed before “any thesis of civil religion can be accepted.”161 Their 
study, though perhaps unsophisticated by today’s standards, illustrates the inherent difficulty in 
evaluating the civil religion theory.  
Four years after the Honor America Day study was published, another Sociologist Ronald 
Wimberly, among others, published findings on an experimental questionnaire designed to test 
for ACR. A common theme to Thomas and Flippen’s work was Billy Graham. Assuming an 
evangelist crusade would suit as a strong testing environment for civil religion, Wimberly found 
support for Bellah’s theory and concluded among crusade attendees civil religion was 
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identifiable and distinct from religion yet also correlated to it.162 Wimberly expanded his 
experiment in 1972 in the form of a questionnaire given to 574 North Carolinians that included 
religious observers, those with political affiliations, and people that demonstrated little to no 
commitment to religion or politics.163 Posed statements were designed to mix political and 
religious themes to measure ACR like, “We should respect a President’s authority since his 
authority is from God” and “To me, the flag of the United States is sacred.”164  
Wimberly found similar results to the initial crusade attendee group with the more 
religiously and politically diverse group from North Carolina. His study included empirical 
support that civil religion “exists alongside of and rather clearly differentiated from the 
churches.”165 The study revealed two interesting points. First, civil religion was more 
distinguishable in a religious or church community than in the general population, and second, 
civil religion was more strongly associated with political conservatism.166 Civil religion and the 
connection to conservatism is a byproduct of both camps typically believing in some supreme 
being. For the current hypothesis of a potentially growing civil religion on both the left and 
right, this is an important consideration—as previous chapters have shown—although religious 
nones include agnostics and atheists, many new nones hold some belief in God. Further, this 
finding corresponds to Bellah’s traditional definition of civil religion as unifying.  
 In 1979, Ronald Wimberly followed the three civil religion measurement studies with an 
assessment of accuracy and reliability in testing the civil religion theory. This was due to the 
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inherent difficulty in defining civil religion. Wimberly sought to ensure the previous studies 
were in fact properly testing for ACR and not some other type of often conflated social or 
political themes. He concluded the studies did measure a single dimension of civil religion 
lending credibility to the techniques and model of the previous findings.167 Wimberly’s studies 
remain perhaps the only empirical and dedicated assessments of ACR in academia. In the 
context of the current environment of declining religious affiliation and growing partisanship, it 
is crucial to recognize Wimberly’s work and relate it to the underrepresented study of civil 
religion today.  
 To this point, little literature or discussion of civil religion existed after the first decade 
following publication of Bellah’s essay. Not until the late 1980s did Robert Wuthnow, a 
sociologist who had worked with Bellah at UC Berkeley, articulate the possibility that civil 
religion could be two distinct representations of political ideology. Wuthnow introduced the 
idea in a 1988 publication of a biblical tradition civil religion and a separate one of political 
enlightenment. He named them simply the conservative and liberal civil religions.168 Wuthnow 
explained the conservative side relies on the foundation that America was formed by Judeo-
Christian values, relayed by the framers, and sanctioned by God. Contrasting, the liberal civil 
religion places a greater emphasis on human rights, justice, and the spread of these values to all 
humankind, not just America.169 While the conservative civil religion tends to justify America’s 
economy, decisions, and policy in terms of holy sanctioning, liberal civil religion holds greater 
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skepticism for American interests and prominence in the world. Departing from Bellah’s 
traditional unifying theory, Wuthnow notes two civil religions opposingly “portray[s] a divine 
order of things, giving us a sense of worth and direction in relation to ultimate purposes.”170 
 This work argues Wuthnow’s concept of two competing ACRs—more than thirty years 
later—has only intensified in scope and applicability as Americans have diverged politically and 
largely thrown off their traditional religious labels. Wimberly observed in the 1970s that civil 
religion was independent of both church and politics. Though the two civil religions may remain 
separate from traditional or spiritual faith, they are likely morphing into political faith.  
The current climate suggests a struggle where conservative civil religion seeks to prove 
and hold onto the idea that whatever America does must and will fall under its prophetic and 
ordained founding mission. At all costs and regardless of any missteps that may have 
misaligned with Biblical commands it seeks to remind above all that America is a chosen state. 
On the other hand, the liberal civil religion seeks to distance itself from the Biblical shrouding of 
Judeo-Christianity but pays credence to a greater power, perhaps the state, that promotes the 
spread of Enlightenment-inspired humanity to all Americans in a universalist language. The 
ambiguity and power of civil religion have made the theory profitable and translatable to both 
the right and left. Both rely on a similar calling of higher purpose and power but in diverging 
practical politics. In the increasingly polar political climate, both religions find power and 
influence at the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. As polarization grows, it becomes 
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more beneficial for each to attract followers or converts on the extreme ends to consolidate 
greater power for their cause.  
Wuthnow’s conservative and liberal civil religion theory did receive some support 
following publication, at least in sociological circles. In 1989, sociology professor James 
Mathisen discussed left and right civil religions as “remarkably similar” to Bellah’s definition but 
represented two visions, “one emphasizing the uniqueness of American experience and the 
other reinterpreting that experience in the international.”171 Mathisen also observed four 
distinct phases of the history of civil religion and noted the last phase as a “wane of ACR 
discussion leading up to 1988.”172 He found ACR to be “resilient, episodic, and dualistic” and 
wrote, “It continues to offer more than one vision of American history and experience that 
Americans never may perceive with a single eye.”173 Herein lies the flexibility of ACR to be 
utilized as a political capital movement. A strength Bellah saw in ACR was its broad definition 
and ability to bring various types of Americans with different views of what America should be 
together in a single patriotic identity. Today, that same broadness in definition makes ACR 
particularly attractive for two separate ideologies to champion. It rings true to both camps and 
general and powerful enough to promote conservative and liberal interests.  
Following along the life cycle of ACR a four-scholar forum submitted their understanding 
of civil religion to a journal in 1994. By the mid-1990s civil religion continued to be explored as a 
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concept but this period also demonstrates a fading focus on civil religion. In response to the lull 
since 1980, Phillip Hammond offered, “a first explanation for that decline might be the 
conceptual fog that has surrounded it from the beginning.”174 Mathisen’s view of ACR’s episodic 
nature combined with the waxing and waning presence of ACR throughout the late 20th 
century has made getting a clear read on ACR difficult. This ambiguity, in all likelihood, assists 
actors in utilizing the power of civil religion for political purposes. In the same forum, Jonathan 
Sarna referenced Wuthnow’s theory of competing civil religions writing that viewing ACR only 
through Bellah’s idea of a unifying force is to “distort the story.”175 He continued that, “divisive 
attempts by various segments of American society to forge a civil religion in their own image is, 
unfortunately, no less a part of the story.”176  
The ability to leverage civil religion for a particular purpose was something Hammond 
called it’s “engineering potential.” Hammond astutely noted a lack of specific doctrine in ACR 
makes it more agreeable to groups than traditional religions since its mission relates more 
generally to “good society.”177 In other words, this inherent vagueness as noted earlier makes 
ACR well-suited to craft into a rallying cry for a particular worldview. Today, this seems directly 
exemplified in President Trump’s campaign tactic of wrapping nationalist views or 
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administration agendas in patriotic civil religion. This provides legitimacy to particular political 
views and in this case, relies on the historical power of civil religion to garner support.  
There are a few ways to explain the rise and success of Trump’s base popularity and 
support from a civil religious perspective. The first, which depends on the traditional Bellah 
definition, regards the total loss of American unity typically utilized by previous presidents. It is 
in this sense that John D. Carlson published his 2017 essay, “Losing Our Civil Religion.” Carlson, 
who notes both George W. Bush and Barack Obama relied on the cohesive power of civil 
religion, argues Trump is the “greatest threat to American civil religion.”178 Carlson, in the 
tradition of Bellah, sees the purpose of ACR as “a model for forging consensus based upon 
founding principles that transcend differences in ethnicity, race, gender, religion, and political 
party.”179 In Carlson’s opinion, Trump has created a system that has turned its back on the 
unifying power of civil religion and instead catered his rhetoric and actions to serve an exclusive 
American constituency, his base, arguably older white evangelicals.  
For some, Trump has simply—building on the perspective of Wuthnow’s two competing 
civil religions—retooled traditional ACR to meet his specific objectives and worldview. Another 
opinion piece from 2017, authored by Benjamin Marcus, argues the propensity of civil religion 
to be used as an inclusive or exclusive political tool. Marcus notes that while ACR has enough 
space to permit various viewpoints, identities, and disagreements, Trump has stoked the vices 
of ACR by drawing lines between Americans, claiming true believers warrant inclusion only by 
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loyalty to his views.180 Trump has capitalized on the power of civil religion by welding his 
political ideology and following to ACR identity. In this sense, the inclusivity of civil religion is 
being redefined to only include specific platform beliefs. From here, one can easily frame 
political opponents as un-American apostates. 
Today, perhaps the leading scholar on ACR and its role in the current climate is Philip 
Gorski. In 2017, Gorski published a sweeping book on the history of ACR that argues the 
importance of reinstating ACR as a unifying force in a divided age. Gorski defines growing right 
and left political movements, not as competing religions, but as religious nationalism and 
radical secularism respectively.181 He argues his predecessor, Bellah, did not go far enough to 
distinguish civil religion from these two ideologies and believes ACR can be reclaimed in the 
traditional sense by America’s “vital center.”182 Ultimately, he argues neither religious 
nationalism nor radical secularism can heal or prevail in American culture because they both 
fundamentally exclude the followers of the other missing the critical element of shared 
belonging.183 
In his most recently published book, Gorski approaches a connecting topic to this 
project—evangelical support for President Trump. Gorski aims to label the right Trump-base 
movement as religious nationalism vice a type of civil religion. He explains one of four key 
segments of post-Reagan Republicanism as white supremacism.184 Gorski offers that white 
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evangelical support for Trump is best explained by the deep historical connection of White 
Christian Nationalism to white evangelicalism.  
The connection of white evangelicals to racism and Trump comes through the 
correlation of white evangelicalism with white Christian nationalism.185 However, he admits one 
anomaly to this connection seems to be that opinion and social polls suggest devout white 
evangelicals are less prejudicial and more open to interracial marriage and immigration than 
other demographics of Trump’s base.186 Gorski writes, “while few white evangelicals would now 
defend white supremacism, some of the theological positions it spawned live on.”187 So, the 
platforms of “opposition to the welfare state and support for free markets,” stanchions of 
white evangelical theology, create an institutional connection to white Christian nationalism 
while remaining distant from personal racism.188 With this in mind, Gorski suggests the issue of 
race will eventually cause white evangelicals to explore how their prejudices may have skewed 
how they understand Scripture. In addressing the future of American Christianity and politics, 
Gorski predicts much of what has been observed in the previous chapters of this project. If the 
current trajectory continues, evangelicalism will fracture along “racial and generational lines” 
and may cave completely. Simultaneously, nones will grow, particularly from the ranks of 
moderates and progressives as they realize there is “no place for them within organized 
religion.”189 
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Gorski’s prediction seems to offer support for this hypothesis and not his belief that 
religious nationalism and radical secularism are at play. If evangelicals splinter over race and 
generation this would be as a result of political or social differences, not theological or religious, 
assuming they maintain their evangelical theology. The rise of nones also supports this theory 
as the cause is an aversion to political religion not traditional spiritual religion. While 
scholarship has differed on exactly how civil religion has been and should be represented since 
Bellah’s 1967 essay, the political power of ACR coupled with decreasing religious affiliation and 
rising partisanship warrants a revisit of Wuthnow’s conservative and liberal civil religion theory. 
This idea is strengthened considering Trump’s blatant and brash approach to wooing 
evangelicals while eschewing any personal commitment to their religious beliefs. The St. John’s 
photo, in particular the contrast of holding up the Bible without paying any personal or religious 
creed to its teachings or the beliefs of its followers, suggests an obvious acknowledgment of the 
political capital at hand for those willing to wrap it in religious garb. 
 
Methodology  
 This chapter utilizes both polling data and a case study addressing recent events to 
better examine the posed research questions. First, election and political contribution data 
from the Center for Responsive Politics is used to measure how political spending is changing. 
Data from charitable contributions are also included to contrast political and religious American 
donation habits. Second, various sources are used to examine the trend of estimated 
attendance and frequency of political protests in the U.S.  
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 A case study is then used to better examine American civil religion in the age of the 
Trump presidency. Tweets and political and religious events are analyzed for connections to 
ACR and specifically the evangelical faith group. These two methods provide a multi-faceted 
approach to determining if Americans are more politically affiliated than religiously affiliated 
and how, as a result, civil religion is affected and possibly changing in a more partisan and less 
religious environment. 
Data Presentation 
 The difficulty of determining if Americans have replaced spiritual religion with political 
religion or if two civil religions exist has been previously discussed. This is most notably due to 
ambiguity in defining civil religion and understanding how it has been implemented or 
exercised in politics. However, to determine how the relationship between religion and politics 
is changing, an attempt to address this interaction must be made. This question has profound 
implications for the future of American democracy and faith as politics continue to divide 
Americans. 
 The gospel of Matthew records Christ’s words, “For where your treasure is, there your 
heart will be also.”190 For Christians, this verse challenges them to search their life for what they 
value to determine what they believe. In other words, what is valued and where and how it is 
spent reveals the heart. Life, especially for modern Americans, consists of two key resources, 
time and money. How these two resources are spent reveals much about what Americans value 
and may show how beliefs in the US are shifting. Increased attention and commitment to 
                                                 
190 Matthew 6:21 (NIV).  
 
  84 
political matters signals a possible greater belief in civil religion than faith religion. For this 
reason, this study analyzes shifts in American spending habits of these two resources.  
Trends in American Contribution Habits 
 Though political donations to campaigns and causes have grown substantially over time 
by corporations, PACs, and lobbyist groups, more telling, is the increase of American individual 
political contributions. The non-partisan think tank, Center for Responsive Politics (CPR), has 
tracked the cumulative political contributions of these groups and individuals to better 
understand how politics is affected by money. Figure 3.1 illustrates the total giving of 
individuals, contributing $200 or more, to political parties or candidates during the noted major 
election year. In this figure CPR’s study represents the long-term trend of contributions related 
to the industries or topics of Health and Energy or Natural resources, two topics hotly debated 
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Figure 3.1 – Individual Political Contributions by Industry (1992-2016) 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Graph compiled by the author.  
 The data for Figure 3.1 includes years that held presidential elections to reflect the 
points throughout the 24-year period that garnered the greatest political contributions. Though 
individual donations typically recede during non-election years the overall trend from this data 
represents a significant increase in the amount of money Americans contribute to affect 
political change in the health and energy sectors. When reviewing the energy and natural 
resources sector, American spending for political purposes, rose over 300 percent from the 
1990s to 2016, where totals eclipsed the $80 million mark.191 On the topic of health, Americans 
have opened their wallets even more freely when considering total dollars. In 2012 and 2016, 
political contributions related to health rose over 200 percent and reached the $159 million 
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mark in both election years.192 Of note is the sharp increase in spending from 2000 to 2012 
where numbers have remained stable and high through 2016. This data set captures 
contributions to these topics for both the Republican and Democratic parties and their 
candidates showing the overall rise in American spending for political causes on both sides of 
the aisle. Though it may not delineate the growth of the number of contributors it does point to 
the increasing importance Americans place on political matters and the growing size of political 
coffers.  
 Regarding partisan politics, two of the most prominent and powerful political groups on 
the conservative and liberal side reflect a similar increasing trend in political spending over 
time. Figure 3.2 shows the growth of political spending by the traditionally conservative gun 
advocacy organization, the National Rifle Association, and the traditionally liberal reproductive 
health organization, Planned Parenthood. 
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Figure 3.2 – Organization Total Contributions to Federal Elections 
        Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Graph compiled by the author.  
 
 Covering the four most recent presidential election years, this data represents overall 
growth in political spending for two organizations on either side of the ideological spectrum. 
From 2004 to 2016, Planned Parenthood increased its spending on federal elections from $552, 
858 to $14,874,250.193 The NRA in comparison spent over $54 million on elections in 2016, 6.5 
times it’s spending in the 2004 election year.194 Both organizations demonstrated exponential 
growth in political contributions during each presidential election over the twelve-year period. 
Though groups like Planned Parenthood and the NRA raise funds from various sources and do 
not necessarily show greater investment by individual members, the overall point is that 
spending for political reasons and purposes has risen sharply over time. These graphs show a 
growing emphasis, from an individual and organizational standpoint, on political matters. 
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 Total political spending across the board is growing, but individual political contributions 
independent of PACs and lobbyist groups demonstrate important changes in how Americans 
engage in politics. A 2017 Campaign Finance Task Force report noted, “individual contributions 
increased roughly 40 percent from 2000 to 2004 and more than doubled from 2008 to 2012.”195 
The report also found direct political contributions from individuals were growing at a faster 
rate than contributions from PACs which was driven by an increase in the number of Americans 
donating to politics.196 This clip signals a growing number of individual citizens are becoming 
more financially invested in the political arena over time.  
 Viewing political contribution trends directly compared with religious contribution 
trends explicitly denotes how American giving patterns are changing. These patterns represent 
more clearly what Americans value and what is changing about what they hold important in 
their daily lives. Figure 3.3 represents the trend of the US population, 18 and over, that has 
contributed $200 or more to a political party, PAC, or candidate per presidential election year. 
Though the number of Americans that contribute to politics is less than 1% of the total 
population, this statistic is on the rise. In 1992, less than a quarter of a percent of US adults sent 
itemizable donations to a political cause. By 2016, that number grew 2.5 times to 0.68 percent 
of the adult population.197  
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Figure 3.3 – Percentage of U.S. Adult Population Contributing to Politics ($200+) 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Graph compiled by the author.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 – Percentage of all U.S. Charitable Contributions to Religious 
Institutions 
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Further, the percentage of Americans giving to politics grew every major election cycle since 
the early 1990s, save 2012.198 This gradual uptick in political spending shows greater American 
individual investment in politics. 
 At the same time Americans are increasing contributions to politics, contributions to 
religion are shrinking. Figure 3.4 shows the trend of total American charity donations that are 
portioned to religious faith groups over time. The same election year cycles were analyzed as 
the years observed in Figure 3.3. Religious institutions received just under 50 percent of all 
donations in 1992 but in 2016 that number fell to its lowest point in the past twenty-four years 
to 32 percent.199 The fall in religious giving is even greater when considering earlier years. In 
1984 religious contributions totaled 57 percent of all charity and in 1990, 54 percent.200 
American charitable contributions have remained steady and grown in totality, however, 
specifically where this money is assigned is changing. This is attributive to the fact that 
Americans are leaving faith groups over time, but they are also redistributing their donations 
and signaling reassignment to different affiliations. Given the increase in political contributions 
from organizations and individuals and the decrease in religious contributions, American 
citizens are shifting priorities and action from faith affiliations to political ones in terms of 
financial capital.  
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Trends in Political Action Habits 
 Financial contributions are only one form of currency, time in the form of action is the 
other basic factor which suggests loyalty, affiliation, and purpose. While Americans contribute 
their time to interests in various ways, one quantifiable measurement is action related to 
exercising First Amendment rights to organize and protest. The desire to engage politically is a 
call more Americans are answering.  
 A Gallup poll published in 2018 found 36 percent of Americans expressed and reported 
an urge to protest compared to just 10 percent in 1965.201 The poll author assesses this 
increase is due to growing polarization but also notes the contrast of the political climate of 
1965 to 2018 as the former included massive unrest due to the civil rights movement and 
growing American distaste for the Vietnam war. While polarization is likely the primary factor 
for this increase the decline of religious affiliation likely also plays a role in American attitudes 
toward civil and political matters.  
 Americans have not just grown in their feelings toward political protests, they have also 
acted on this urge in greater commitment and numbers. The March for Life pro-life movement, 
formed in 1974 on the heels of the Roe v. Wade decision, represents one single-issue example 
of rising American protests. Since its beginning, the rally held in Washington D.C. has attracted 
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Figure 3.5 – Estimated Attendance at March for Life Rallies 
 
Source: March for Life and The New York Times. Graph compiled by the author.  
 
Figure 3.5 shows the estimated attendance of marchers at the event over time. Though some 
years have varied in size, 2013, the 40th anniversary of the Roe v. Wade decision, marked the 
largest historical crowd size at well over a half-million participants.202 Later marches dwindled 
to estimates in the hundred thousand range but leverage for the movement has grown with 
Donald Trump, the first sitting President to directly speak to marchers, present at the January 
2020 event.203 Over the history of the movement, the rally has grown considerably from its 
modest roots.  
 The recent years of the Trump presidency have seen accelerated political action among 
Americans and various causes. 2017, the first year of Trump’s time in office, registered a drastic 
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escalation in American protests. A sweeping 2020 study from the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies found U.S. protests grew 330 percent in January 2017 compared to the 
previous year.204 The study also noted a general increase and sustainment of various highly 
attended political protests aimed at issues including immigration, pro-choice, pro-life, teacher 
salaries, pride, climate change, science, truth, and Trump’s travel ban.205 One event mentioned 
in the study, the Women’s March event, quickly followed Trump’s 2017 inauguration and has 
drawn sizable followings across the country in subsequent years. The march, which promotes 
various human and women’s rights issues, attracted an estimated 470,000 marchers in 2017.206  
 It would be negligent to not strengthen this point with the continued civil and political 
unrest across the U.S. at the time of this writing. The killing of George Floyd while in 
Minneapolis police custody on May 25, 2020, has resulted in an explosion of nationwide and 
global protests aimed at addressing American police brutality and racial injustice. The scope 
and number of political protests—as well as subsequent and ongoing protests against federal 
and state statues honoring Confederate war officers—has reached a fever pitch unseen by the 
current American generation. In the two weeks following Floyd’s death, hundreds of protests 
erupted in various cities in every single American state.207 The ongoing nature and scale of the 
protests have not allowed a detailed study of the exact participation of the Black Lives Matter 
(BLM) and related organizational protests but it is definitively staggering in scope. A recent New 
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York Times article estimated a half-million protesters turned out to more than 550 events 
across the U.S. on June 6, 2020. The authors have totaled up at least 4,700 protests since May 
26 at an average of 140 a day.208 Further, four separate polls have shown between 15 million 
and 26 million Americans self-reported protesting in a demonstration making the current BLM 
protests the largest in national history.209 
 An eventual reflective and comprehensive study of this movement will do much to 
understand the growth of American political participation related to the studies and polls 
included in this work. Regardless of issue or catalyst, political protests have dramatically 
increased in recent years lending credibility to the hypothesis that Americans are replacing 
religious participation with politics. This is evident in the combined trending factors of 
increased political spending with decreased religious spending and increased political protests 
with declining religious affiliation. 
 
Donald Trump and American Civil Religion 
 The rapid rise in political giving and action, particularly protests, has accelerated during 
the Trump presidency. As religion declines and politics become more widespread in American 
dialogue it is crucial to look at how Trump may be redefining civil religion. To Benjamin Marcus’ 
argument, Trump has focused his efforts on identifying himself with certain traditional pillars of 
civil religion. Unlike Bellah’s original definition of civil religion that described it as a force used 
by Lincoln and Kennedy to unite all Americans by describing their shared identity using deeply 
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religious language, Trump has revived a form of Wuthnow’s definition. Trump’s use of civil 
religion is one that aligns with his specific political platform and worldview and serves to 
exclude any opposers as heretics of America. By defining opposition as non-American, Trump’s 
use of ACR emboldens his base and draws a stark line between believers and non-believers. In 
this way, the right or conservative civil religion is the one true American civil religion. Trump has 
seized the generality and inclusivity of ACR to serve his particular political brand and in doing so 
leverages the power of the entirety of ACR for conservative civil religion.  
 Current civil religion has undergone a reemergence and transition from its absence in 
the 1990s. This transition has been primarily facilitated by the rise of partisanship and increased 
political engagement after the turn of the century. By drawing two distinct camps and aligning 
his with ACR, the Trump administration represents three possibilities for the new stage of civil 
religion. First, as previously mentioned, Bellah’s ACR has been reconfigured and aligned with 
conservative civil religion making it a singular disunifying force with no opposing liberal civil 
religion. Second, sharpening polarization and growing political activity suggests Wuthnow’s 
thesis of two competing right and left civil religions. Or third, in the traditional definition, ACR is 
simply dead or dormant in the current era. This case study will follow Trump’s use of three 
mainstays of civil religion to better understand how it is currently represented. These pillars 
include the national anthem, the American flag, and national statues and monuments.  
National Anthem Protests 
 Francis Scott Key’s lyrics put to music has long stood as a cultural norm to be played and 
observed before national moments to include sporting events. As a national anthem, the song 
and reverence paid to its playing, has long represented a key element of patriotic sentiment 
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and national unity. Colin Kaepernick, a backup quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers, first 
launched a protest, in what would become a nationwide affair and debate, by sitting during the 
national anthem before a preseason NFL game in late 2016. When asked about his decision 
after the game, Kaepernick explained his protest aimed to bring attention to police brutality 
and racial injustice, “I’m not going to stand up or show pride in a flag for a country that 
oppresses black people and people of color.”210 By the 2017 season, Kaepernick had amended 
his protest in the form of kneeling for the anthem. His ongoing movement sparked a broader 
voice of players in the NFL and gained a considerable following which catalyzed a media frenzy 
and national conversation.  
 The protests caught an explosive momentum when President Trump, in the same year, 
tweeted NFL owners should get any “son of a bitch” that protested off the field.211 Trump 
continued to tweet about the topic and encouraged owners to fire any player that would 
disrespect the flag or anthem. During his campaign, Trump heralded patriotic sentiments as a 
cornerstone and continued to define himself, by frequency of address, as a protectorate of the 
anthem and flag. In the fall of 2017, Trump tweeted about the NFL 18 times in a month and by 
late October had mentioned the anthem protests in 12% of his total tweets.212 Trump’s 
involvement in the anthem protests escalated tension between NFL owners, the league 
commissioner, and players. In early June 2020, after NFL commissioner Roger Goodell stated 
the league had failed in properly addressing player protests, Trump reignited the issue with a 
                                                 
210 Cindy Boren, “A timeline of Colin Kaepernick’s protests against police brutality,” The Washington Post, June 1, 
2020. 
211 Boren, “A timeline of Colin Kaepernick’s protests against police brutality,” The Washington Post.  
212 Sam Belden, “Trump tweeted about the NFL and national anthem 37 times in a month,” Business Insider, 
October 23, 2017.  
 
 
  97 
tweet expressing that Goodell’s statement could indicate the NFL was okay with players 
disrespecting the flag and anthem.213 Kaepernick’s actions in 2017 proved prescient in the 
current wake of the George Floyd killing which has continued the divide and national dialogue 
concerning police violence. Trump’s insistence on continuing to bring the issue to surface and 
frame NFL anthem protests as disrespectful to the flag, military, and country, reveals his 
continued strategy to align himself with these symbols of civil religion. His tweets reinforce his 
commitment to protect these elements to his base of ACR believers and combat any counter-
belief.  
 
Flag Burning and Monuments 
 In hand with his campaign to protect proper observance of the national anthem, Trump 
has repeatedly declared his disdain for the burning of the American flag. With reverence 
toward the flag, he has positioned himself as the protector of another banner of ACR. In June of 
2019, Trump tweeted that he was in full support of a constitutional amendment to ban flag 
burning calling the issue a “no brainer.” Moreover, following a speech a few days later he 
walked with outstretched arms toward an onstage pedestaled American flag and hugged it as 
cameras flashed.214 During his controversial June 20, 2020 campaign rally in Tulsa, OK, Trump 
once again highlighted flag burning by reiterating his belief that anyone that burns an American 
flag in protest should be put in jail for a year.215 Trump called on GOP legislators to introduce a 
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law that would introduce a minimum one-year sentence.216 In the same speech, Trump 
attacked the NFL anthem protests and claimed, “Never kneel—we will stand proud and stand 
tall.”217 After starkly outlining his position on these symbols of ACR, Trump tied attacks on these 
elements directly to civil religion by claiming liberal culture aimed to “prosecute Americans for 
going to church but not burning a church.”218 This point is demonstrative of Trump’s conflation 
of the attack of key symbols of American identity with attacks on the American church and 
Christianity, ensuring the connection between the anthem and the flag with Americans who go 
to church. An overarching theme of Trump’s 2020 campaign messaging is identifying himself as 
the defender of American symbols.  
 This is perhaps most evident by Trump’s recent speech given on July 4th, an important 
civil religious holiday, in the backdrop of a prominent civil religious monument, Mount 
Rushmore. Trump repeatedly discussed the destruction of monuments to America’s founding 
and history by “angry mobs.” He later declared America’s children should be “taught to love our 
country, honor our history, and respect our great American flag.”219 Trump further defined 
himself as a protector of civil symbols by referencing his signing of an executive order to 
prosecute those who “damage or deface federal statues or monuments” with a minimum ten-
year sentence.220 After extolling various historical American figures, Trump announced his 
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intent to sign an executive order creating a National Garden of American Heroes, an outdoor 
space filled with statues of prominent Americans.221  
 
The Evangelical Base 
 No other President in modern memory has so symbolically framed a speech with the 
pillars of ACR and spoke with such primary focus on ACR themes. However, an integral factor of 
Trump’s use of ACR is the linkage to his religious base. His success in appealing to the strength 
of his 2016 white evangelical base rests on marrying conservative civil religion to himself and 
Christianity. In the same way he promotes the defense of elements of civil religion, he 
promotes the defense of religious ideals and values to better define them as one and the same. 
Evident in his Independence Day remarks, Trump, in condemning protestors intent on 
destroying America’s history referenced the lyrics of the Battle Hymn of the Republic, a song 
that has long defined ACR and blended religious overtones with American ideals.222  
 Trump’s doubling down on the use of ACR to promote the cause of American religion is 
a calculated attempt to maintain his strong white evangelical base from 2016. The St. John’s 
Episcopal Bible photo demonstrated the power of fusing a political worldview to religious 
imagery and a clear example of Trump’s unabashed use of this tool. The religious response to 
this event revealed division, inside of the Christian faith, between adherents of traditional 
spiritual faith and adherents that define themselves more strongly in terms of conservative civil 
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religion. Trump’s act in Lafayette Square drew sharp condemnation from the Washington D.C. 
Episcopal Bishop and many other faith leaders in mainstream Protestant denominations, but 
some prominent evangelical voices expressed their support. Franklin Graham, son of Billy 
Graham and an ardent backer of President Trump, after being asked about the event tweeted 
that he wasn’t offended and was “encouraged by it.”223 Robert Jeffress, the pastor of the 
14,000 member First Baptist Church in Dallas, stated Trump’s actions at St. John’s Episcopal 
were “completely appropriate” and “..by holding up the Bible, he was showing us that it 
teaches that, yes, God hates racism, it’s despicable—but god also hates lawlessness.”224 Jeffress 
has been a staunch advocate and an important link to Trump’s ACR and the evangelical 
community.  
 On June 28, 2020, Pastor Jeffress hosted a “Celebrate Freedom Sunday” at First Baptist 
before the July 4th holiday. The church service featured guest speaker Vice President Mike 
Pence. Thousands of parishioners waved tiny American flags with Ben Carson, Texas Senator 
John Cornyn, and Texas Governor Greg Abbott in attendance.225 The service represented an 
overt nod to ACR and evangelicalism as it opened with renditions of the national anthem and 
the anthems of the military service branches. Pence focused on discussing his personal faith as 
well as elements of Trump’s 2020 campaign platform touting his work of strengthening the 
military, protecting Second Amendment rights, and supporting the pro-life movement.226 A 
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reporter noted that Pence received a standing ovation of applause after discussing the 
importance of supporting law enforcement.227 
 The Celebrate Freedom Sunday program serves as one data point showing Trump has 
only escalated his efforts to align his 2020 reelection campaign with ACR themes and Christian 
evangelicalism. However, there is some evidence that cracks are forming in evangelical support 
for the President. These cracks have only begun to show in the face of the handling of the 
COVID-19 pandemic and Trump’s hardline approach against racial injustice protests. Due to the 
timing and themes, these cracks suggest some moderate evangelicals are becoming averse to 
conservative civil religion aligned with their faith affiliation. In early June 2020, 30 mostly white 
evangelicals from fields such as politics, the ministry, and psychology published a compilation of 
essays in a book titled The Spiritual Danger of Donald Trump which seeks to illustrate the 
spiritual imperative to unhitch evangelicalism from the President.228 Pew Research published a 
poll finding in May 2020 that showed white evangelical approval of Trump’s response to the 
coronavirus pandemic fell 6 percentage points from March 2020, though as a bloc, support for 
Trump remains high.229 
 Further, Trump’s approach toward protests following the death of George Floyd serves 
as another area where evangelical views may be shifting from the President’s. Amid widespread 
protests, Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) President J.D. Greear, called for the retirement of a 
gavel, used since 1872 to open meetings and named for the founder of the Southern Baptist 
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Theological Seminary and Confederate sympathizer and slaveholder, John A. Broadus.230 
Greear, president of the major evangelical organization with its complicated past of slavery, 
stated the news a day after he urged congregants to say “black lives matter.”231 The SBC’s move 
to definitively vocalize their position on racial injustice contrasts with Trump’s remarks. The 
handling of the COVID-19 pandemic response combined with massive civil unrest surrounding 
racial injustice may be the line some evangelicals have drawn to distance themselves from 
Trump’s ACR.  Ultimately, these events may show support for the thesis that Trump has 
configured ACR to support his political purposes. Chapter two of this work showed the exodus 
of moderate mainline protestants and Catholics to the Democratic Party and the nones 
category. The possible fracturing of the evangelical base in the 2020 election may represent a 
similar pattern of aversion to the blending of faith affiliation and a particular political party. 
Moderate evangelicals may break from their conservative civil religion counterparts for a more 
detached spiritual faith affiliation or begin to assign as nones.  
 
Analysis and Discussion 
 Though a detailed explanation and assessment of ACR in the current era remains a 
challenging problem, there are points regarding changes in American religious and political 
activity that are evidentially supported in this study. Data compiled for Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show 
a stark rise in political spending by both individuals and groups over the past two decades. 
Additionally, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 support this first point and also show the decline of 
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religious contributions, while Americans at the same time, are giving more and in greater 
numbers to political causes. While Figure 3.5 shows the growth of political participation from a 
single-issue perspective, research from CSIS and news sources illustrates the widespread nature 
of American protests in many forms and on various issues. However, the rise of U.S. domestic 
protests observed in the past few years pales in comparison to the magnitude of current civil 
unrest and the Black Lives Matter movement. The data from this chapter, when viewed with 
the broader research in this project, support the growth of political engagement, affiliation, and 
belief over religious association. While partisanship has likely served as the main contributor to 
the growth of political action, religious decline, as shown in previous chapters, is inextricably 
linked to these outcomes.  
 The connection to religious decline and the rise of political engagement will be better 
understood by a focus on and greater study of the current health of ACR. The unique and 
religiously toned nature of civil religion makes it a suitable vehicle for Americans to transition 
from traditional religious faith to political faith and identity. Based on President Trump’s use of 
ACR, this faith has revealed its power as an effective habitat for the growth of conservative 
politics.  
On the left, this study has not approached or explored the validity of liberal civil religion. 
On one hand, the BLM protests and growth of anti-Trump political movements like the 
Women’s March and the tearing down of Confederate statues point to the possibility of a 
liberal civil religion that is mostly counter to the right and Trump’s ACR. However, the idea of 
liberal civil religion lacks the religious overtones and historical connections that more easily 
define conservative civil religion with evangelicalism and the Republican party. This fact does 
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not definitively mean a liberal civil religion does not exist but based on the more traditional 
definition, it is more likely the tenure of the Trump presidency supports the first explanation of 
the current civil religion environment. That is, ACR has become one with his platform and an 
excluding power. Additional study should be conducted to assess the possibility that the rise of 
leftist political ideology and engagement behaves and identifies in the same way as 
conservative civil religion. Further, this requires broadening the definition of civil religion to 
determine how political beliefs may reflect similar effects as the religious rhetoric and 




 Considering the first segment of the arguments cited in this chapter, Americans are 
trending toward greater faith and belief in politics by way of increasing political engagement. 
While political spending by groups and organizations has increased, individual Americans are 
also spending more on politics over time. In addition to spending, more Americans are 
mobilizing, protesting, and interacting in politics. This trend will likely continue to gain strength, 
particularly when time affords a comprehensive look at current civil unrest amidst a national 
and global pandemic. Further, it is clear while Americans are becoming more political and 
partisan, they are also shedding these same engagements in traditional religious groups. The 
relationship between these two trends is identifiable as the decline of religion seems to feed 
the growth of American focus on politics.  
 This relationship supports the idea that Americans are trading their religious identities 
and associations with ones aligned with a particular political worldview. The translation of faith 
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to politics meaning the rise of civil religion is a more difficult connection to evidentially support. 
Civil religion has proved “episodic” as it has risen and faded from academic discourse and 
political discussion. However, the Trump presidency marks an important shift in the way ACR 
operates in American politics. The voting pattern of white evangelicals in the 2020 presidential 
election will be instrumental in understanding Trump’s impact on ACR and how it interacts with 
evangelical Christians. A break in support for Trump and how or if evangelicals begin to drop 
their faith tag in the future, combined with the continued rise of the nones, will strengthen 
points proposed in this project.  
 As for the current state of civil religion, Trump’s attempted association with traditional 
ACR symbols and narratives is clear. His divisive and polarizing rhetoric and impact on American 
politics mark an evolution in ACR as a divisive political weapon rather than a unifying power. It 
must be noted literature and study of civil religion are monopolized by voices from the field of 
sociology. More studies must be done in the field of politics to better understand the presence 
of ACR in politics and its impact on the electorate. Further studies should resurrect a form of 
Ronald Wimberly’s questionnaire to better assess the current state of civil religion. This type of 
study, in conjunction with the findings of greater political engagement, could shed light on the 
validity of Wuthnow’s competing civil religion thesis and perhaps show if nones on the liberal 
side of the political spectrum hold a type of ACR belief. Questions could also be developed to 
examine the possibility of a separation between American evangelicals that identify with 
conservative civil religion and those who identify with the evangelical spiritual tradition.  
 Recent events, at the time of this writing, promote in some sense more questions but 
also more uncultivated data and case studies from which to explore how politics and faith are 
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interacting. In the tense political and cultural climate, the impact of these two themes grows in 
importance as American unity seems a characteristic of a bygone era. All Americans would do 
well to consider these questions of identity and how each may affect an individual’s purpose 






















 As noted in the introduction, current events, have magnified certain elements of the 
relationship between American faith and politics. At the very least, the COVID-19 pandemic and 
Black Lives Matter protests have exposed deeply held belief structures inside the American 
populace and have highlighted discrepancies between how Americans act on these beliefs. The 
research and study involved with this thesis have produced many new questions and avenues 
for continued scholarship on this subject as dynamics change. The evolving relationship 
between religion and politics includes a deep well of nuances and unexplored areas that require 
addressing to better understand the scope and nature of this topic. However, this study has 
concluded some major findings to promote additional consideration.  
 
1. America’s religious profile is indeed changing, Nones are growing and Christian groups are 
in decline. 
 Chapter one concluded American faith affiliation is shrinking and the number of 
religious nones continues to grow rapidly. This finding is further reinforced by evidence that 
shows this trend will proceed into the foreseeable future. Millennials and Post-Millennials are 
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leaving the faith in higher numbers than previous generations and express social, cultural, and 
political views that demonstrate an aversion to the historical linkage of Christianity, in 
particular, with conservative politics. The ranks of the religiously unaffiliated will continue to be 
supplied by these younger generations and Protestant Christian numbers will suffer as a result.  
 
2. Evangelical Christianity has proved resilient and survivable compared to other Christian 
traditions. 
 Though a growing portion of nones has left the Mainline Protestant and Catholic faith 
traditions for the religious non-affiliated label, evangelicals have sustained their numbers over 
time. Evangelicals have also retained the largest number of Millennial followers of any faith-
based group. This may be due to the survivability and force of their theological beliefs but could 
also be attributed to their slide right politically and socially that may attract and retain more 
conservative Americans that see this worldview threatened by faith decline. However, given the 
rapid growth of nones and overall Christian decline, evangelicals are not immune to the 
patterns currently affecting Mainline Protestants and would do well to acknowledge this fact.  
 
3. Partisanship continues to grow while religion declines. 
 While the exact interaction between these two facts is not fully understood at this time, 
the correlation is clear. The increase of partisanship in the U.S. is forcing changes in how 
Americans assign to and identify with a religion. As a result, faith groups will either lose 
relevance and numbers or adopt and strengthen a political ideology on the extreme end of the 
spectrum. Drawing on the conclusions of the second chapter, moderate and more socially 
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liberal Christians in the Mainline Protestant faith traditions are the largest group leaving their 
traditional faith tag to become nones. While Christianity declines, currently among Mainline 
Protestants, the reassignment of Christians as nones will likely creep into moderate evangelical 
camps. This movement could push remaining evangelicals under threat further right politically. 
As this occurs simultaneously with political polarization traditional evangelicalism becomes 
more aligned with and identified by Republican political identity producing an overall effect of 
greater dissent between the political left and right fueling polarization. This is not to say that all 
traditional or spiritual religion is dead or will become nonexistent but that this interaction 
pushes traditional religion into the political sphere ultimately costing it not only adherents but 
also wounding the historical faith-politics separation.  
 
4. Evangelicals are growing in influence and numbers inside the Republican Party while 
Nones are doing so in the Democratic Party. 
 Chapter two assessed and tracked the many movements of Christians and nones 
politically. As nones assign as Democrats with increasing frequency and strength, evangelicals 
as a result are gaining a greater foothold in the Republican party. This finding likely means more 
evidence that Americans, by faith assignment as well, are growing apart politically paving the 
way for greater political and theological division.  
 
5. Americans are increasingly engaging in politics rather than religion. 
 Though it may seem obvious given the fall in religious affiliation, politics are gaining 
importance in the lives of American citizens. Both organizations and individuals are giving more 
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money to political matters while religious contributions decline. Additionally, Americans are 
protesting in greater numbers, at greater frequency, and for more political issues. This finding 
supports a running hypothesis in this thesis that Americans are trading religion for politics.  
 
6. President Trump’s use of American civil religion represents a new understanding of the 
theory.  
 The power of civil religious symbology has proved itself a valuable resource to the 
Trump administration’s reelection campaign strategy. Trump has used civil religion in a 
distinctly different way than previous presidents as a rallying tool for a base of political 
supporters rather than a unifying force for American cohesion. Civil religion appears to be an 
effective device for Trump to court and keep white evangelicals, those most attracted to 
political conservatism and the advancement of their religious beliefs in government. Yet, how 
white and other evangelicals vote in the 2020 presidential election could reveal a fusing of 
these matters that crosses a sacred line for some. The evangelical vote will be particularly 
important to determine if a schism exists between political and more traditionally spiritual 
evangelicals. The growth of partisanship and the migration of political discourse to the ends of 
the spectrum have facilitated the use of ACR in this way. The current state of politics and 
religion has altered civil religion from its original definition because of its foundational feature 
that powerfully combines these two themes.  
 It is worth noting here Rousseau’s theoretical problem with spiritual religion and its 
impact on the effectiveness of civil religion. Rousseau believed Christianity, in particular, posed 
a threat to civil religion for the state because its adherents—fixated on the spiritual realm of 
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the eternal—could pollute the duty and responsibility of the earthly purpose of citizens. 
Christopher Wraight explains Rousseau believed, “there is nothing worse for the social spirit 
than having the attention of the populace detached from the world and diverted to 
considerations of the hereafter.”232 This sentiment was echoed by Fichte’s observation, 
referenced at the beginning of the second chapter, that the early Christians were transported 
“wholly beyond the earth” by their belief in the afterlife.  
 Rousseau’s solution to the problem of spiritual religion was national generally agreed 
upon “creeds” that would be distant enough from a specific theology to protect against eternal 
distraction but close enough to provide civic and societal moral guidance toward a common 
purpose.233 In Bellah’s traditional explanation of ACR, this has been the modus operandi. 
However, Trump’s coupling of ACR themes and symbols to his Republican base and 
evangelicalism forces Christians, even more than they already have in the U.S., to enter the 
political sphere to protect their interests. In effect, a threat to one of the combined entities, 
ACR symbols, Christianity, or Republican platforms represents a threat to all. Conversely, this 
creates further exclusion and dissonance as Americans that are not proponents of these must 
vehemently reject their influence and promotion.  
 Scholastically, the specific effect of declining American religion and the rise of the nones 
on democracy has been underserved. Though there is much scholarship identifying the nones 
and discussing trending religious disaffiliation, there is less that confronts how these changes 
interact with polarization. This thesis acts as only an initial introduction to this topic that is 
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perhaps changing too rapidly to fully understand at the moment. Civil religion, a term that has 
faded from common academic discussion in previous decades, is a theory that now deserves 
reintroduction to scholarship particularly in the field of political science. Though this thesis has 
found evidential points to support the overarching hypothesis that politics are supplanting 
religion, there are many additional areas to study before conclusively sealing this claim.  
 Studies should be conducted on media intake and daily habit patterns of both religious 
and non-religious Americans. Chapter two cited a concern of prominent Pastor Tim Keller that 
American Christians were more exposed to and affected by political intake than Scripture 
reading or prayer. In the 24/7 news cycle, filled with political commentators as entertainment, 
and the explosive power of social media, even devout religiously affiliated Americans are likely 
overtaken and influenced by political matters rather than religious. A better understanding of 
what Americans spend their daily time doing, viewing, and reading will show how politics or 
religion may affect their identity and purpose.  
 This thesis primarily examined evangelicals and to a lesser extent nones. To develop a 
more comprehensive picture of this topic, research should, with greater depth, be conducted 
on Catholicism, Mormonism, Judaism, and Islam in the U.S. Do similar patterns follow in these 
faith traditions? If not, why and are these faith groups changing due to polarization? Are they as 
homogenous in a political voice as evangelicals or is politics less influential?  
 Another limitation of this study was the focus on general evangelicalism or white 
evangelicals. Black evangelicals as a subgroup portray some political similarities to white 
evangelicals but also diverging priorities on certain issues. Understanding the impact of race on 
political and religious assignment will shed greater light on the questions put forward in this 
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thesis. Given the heightened focus on racial inequality in America, race plays an important, and 
perhaps more prominent role in political affiliation than theology.  
 Lastly, if Americans are replacing faith with a more powerful belief in and commitment 
to politics then the study of liberal none’s political cohesion compared to that of conservative 
evangelical’s is crucial. Do nones vote and act, on certain social issues, with the same 
homogeny as evangelicals? Are political contributions on the right and the left, fervor and 
enthusiasm, and unity of voice on certain issues mirrored on either end? If so, this may show 
similar beliefs and actions supporting the hypothesis. As discussed in the third chapter, 
regarding Wuthnow’s thesis of two competing liberal and conservative civil religions, ACR 
seamlessly integrates conservative politics with religious themes and language already common 
to religious affiliates on the right. A liberal civil religion, largely secular and proposedly filled 
with nones, would be unfamiliar with and uninfluenced by such religious rhetoric. However, this 
in itself does not mean liberal civil religion is a myth or that a civil religion on the left cannot 
operate in the same way as one on the right. If a growing power of political beliefs on the left 
and right increasingly drives action, mission, and life purpose, then there may be little that 
practically differentiates a civil religion on the left and right other than religious terminology.  
 The COVID-19 pandemic, and associated federal, state, and local restrictions to stop the 
spread of the virus and disputes over these decisions emphasizes the variance between how 
religious and political beliefs are observed in the U.S. American courts have a long history of 
exempting religious groups from certain laws as protected under the First Amendment. With 
the decline of religious affiliation and rise in political engagement, these exemptions present an 
applicable governmental challenge with current events. While this topic has accumulated 
 
  114 
enough recent attention and court challenges to spark a full study alone, it bears mentioning 
the comparison and contrast between religious gatherers and Black Lives Matter protestors 
both eager to confront stay-at-home orders to suit their interests.  
 In March 2020, a Florida pastor was arrested after defiantly holding public services in 
opposition to an order against large gatherings. Two days later, after mostly conservative 
backlash, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis overruled labeling religious services as essential 
activities.234 Texas Governor Greg Abbott, a Republican in a red state, in an executive order 
directing Texans to “minimize social gatherings,” ensured religious services were exempted 
from the order.235 Two months later, the growing protests following George Floyd’s death 
created a similar issue on the left. In June, Pennsylvania’s Democratic Governor Tom Wolf 
received criticism after defying his own stay-at-home recommendations to march with Black 
Lives Matter protestors in the state’s capital, Harrisburg. After being asked if he planned to 
quarantine following his exposure to so many people, Wolf replied he “thought that the risk 
was worth taking for that specific cause.”236 Similar incidents occurred across the country while 
COVID-19 orders have prompted numerous First Amendment challenges and highlighted legal 
differences between religious gatherers and political protestors.  
 Questions of applicability and exemption regarding COVID-19 state executive orders for 
religious or political gatherings present a germane segue way to how recent events are 
revealing the impact of changes in American religion and politics. These events practically 
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represent the balance between the two at risk. The influence of religion on American 
democracy has been a cornerstone since the nation’s founding. While politics will always exist 
as an elemental part of government, faith is perhaps more fragile in a democracy. If religion 
fully shrinks from the American experience then something must fill its place, or at least, its 
impact on politics. Given the findings of this study, the growing hole left by declining traditional 
religion will likely be filled by partisan ideology and identity which already threatens American 
solidarity. For some Americans, religious decline may be a welcomed trend but all, both 
religious and secular, should understand this historical intersection and balance has largely 
defined and upheld American governance. Perhaps changes in the religious and political 
landscape should not immediately elicit alarm or excitement but they should produce, at the 
very least, closer examination and study as these institutions are the integral underpinnings of 
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